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ABSTRACT





Dr. Elizabeth Fraterrigo, Examination Committee Chair 
Assistant Professor of History 
University of Nevada, Las Vegas
This thesis, by examining how business, government, and civic leaders promoted 
civil defense, shows how a policy of self-help merged the roles of citizen and consumer 
and how family-centered preparedness equated the survival of the nuclear family with the 
victory of the US in the Cold War. Civil defense officials helped reinforce messages 
about gender roles by stressing the value of nuclear families and the crucial role each 
family member played in the defense of America. Public information campaigns 
emphasized the importance of free enterprise and privatization by endorsing a policy of 
self-help for American families whereby individual families were responsible for the 
purchase of their own means of survival. This thesis will help us better understand the 
early years of the Cold War by showing how consumption became entwined with civic 
duty through the efforts of civil defense officials. These efforts created an image of civil 
defense that centered on a model citizen in the marketplace purchasing the products 
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A leaflet distributed to owners of Dairy Dan Ice Cream trucks from the early 
1950s asserted that the owners’ trucks were “now an official unit of the United States 
Civil Defense Network,” it went on to list a variety of ways the trucks could provide 
crucial services following an atomic attack. The trucks could provide refrigeration, 
illumination, and a clean water supply. It praised the owners saying, “You and your 
Dairy Dan unit are of inestimable value to your community.”' The assertion that an ice 
cream truck could prove invaluable in case of an atomic attack proves useful in 
understanding the ways in which civil defense entered the American consciousness in the 
early years of the Cold War. By assuming that ice cream trucks would still be circling 
suburban neighborhoods following an atomic bomb blast, the leaflet downplayed the real 
threat of atomic war. It also demonstrates the crucial institutionalization of civil defense 
in the marketplace as everyday goods and services became identified as part o f the 
survival effort. Americans faced a multitude of messages about preparedness during the 
early years of the Cold War, all of which largely held to the official position that survival 
of an atomic bomb was possible. Civil defense provides an important lens on the ways 
that the Cold War entered everyday domestic life and how the concept of consensus
’ Dairy Dan Leaflet, Virgil L. Couch Papers, 1951-1958 (Couch Papers); Box 20, Civil Defense 
Publications by Businesses and Corporations, 1950-1958 (5), Dwight D. Eisenhower Presidential Library 
(DDEL).
helped shape postwar American culture and politics. The idea o f consensus linked 
consumption with democracy, helped define appropriate roles for men and women, and 
pitted American affluence as a counter to Soviet communism. This thesis, by examining 
how business, government, and civic leaders promoted civil defense, shows how a policy 
o f self-help merged the roles of citizen and consumer and how family-centered 
preparedness equated the survival of the family with the victory o f the US in the Cold 
War. It is not concerned with the number of shelters constructed or volunteers committed 
to recovery, but instead with the ways in which the promotion o f civil defense helped to 
inform the consensus of the postwar period and why Americans largely rejected such 
preparedness measures. Examining the selling of civil defense offers a way of seeing the 
dialogue that existed between the Cold War and domestic consumption during this 
period.
Figure 1- Leaflet distributed to Dairy Dan Ice Cream Truck Owners
In 1950, President Harry S. Truman established the Federal Civil Defense 
Administration (FCDA) with the goal of limiting casualties in the event of an atomic war 
with the Soviet Union. The concept of civil defense, resting on a premise that it was 
possible to survive an atomic, and later hydrogen, bomb blast was a tough sell for the 
American public, but nevertheless American policymakers, business leaders, and civic 
groups united to promote the cause. The idea of civil defense stretched well beyond the 
sphere of preparedness and offered information about home, family, and morality. The 
selling of civil defense, because of its connection to both mass consumption and the Cold 
War, allows us to identify the real relationship that existed between the Cold War and 
domestic politics and culture.
Recognizing that a massive program of state-sponsored shelter building was 
contrary to the American view on the role of government, the FCDA focused its attention 
on a massive public education campaign. This effort not only aimed to instruct 
Americans about the need for civil defense, but the campaign also promoted the free 
enterprise system with its dependence on corporate sponsorship. Faced with chronic 
budget shortages, the FCDA established a series of partnerships with private enterprise 
under the guise of “cooperative promotion” to educate Americans about civil defense.^ 
Promoters of civil defense elevated their message from a policy of preparation against 
possible nuclear attack to a hallmark of patriotic, good citizenship for Americans. Home 
preparedness, one o f the most important civil defense policies o f the early 1950s, 
emphasized efficiency and preparation for the suburban home as crucial in sustaining the 
nation during and after an attack. This policy used the moral foundations of American
 ^This phrase appears throughout official FCDA literature to refer to collaborations with various 
mass media outlets to spread the message o f civil defense.
homes and families and recast homemaking from a domestic duty into a civic obligation. 
Civil defense officials helped reinforce messages about gender roles by stressing the 
value o f nuclear families and the crucial role each family member played in the defense 
of America. Other campaigns emphasized the importance of free enterprise and 
privatization by endorsing policies of self-help for American families and lauding the 
participation of private companies in the nation’s civil defense efforts. Together these 
efforts created an image of civil defense that centered on a model citizen in the 
marketplace purchasing the products needed to guarantee his and his family’s own 
survival.
The FCDA worked with many groups to spread its message of survival. The non­
profit Advertising Council created and distributed a number of public service campaigns 
on the need for preparedness. Atomic bomb tests at the Nevada Test Site provided the 
FCDA with important opportunities to assess the effectiveness o f civil defense policy and 
to drum up interest in the civil defense program. Civic organizations and private 
companies also took part in the distribution of survival information. Each of these key 
groups played an important role in the promotion of civil defense during the early Cold 
War.
Cold War civil defense, though it took on a decidedly different form, had its 
origin in World War II. President Franklin Roosevelt took the first official steps for 
preparedness during World War II when he created the Office o f Civilian Defense in 
1941 to “coordinate measures of federal, state, and local government for protection of the
civilian population in war emergencies.”  ^ In 1945, President Truman disbanded the 
office by executive order."* The testing o f an atomic bomb by the USSR in 1949, 
however, regenerated interest in civil defense and, bowing to public pressure. President 
Truman asked the National Security Resources Board (NSRB) to take over survival 
planning.^ In 1950, at the advice of the NSRB he established the Federal Civil Defense 
Administration in the office of emergency management with an executive order.^ Shortly 
after. Congress passed legislation to make it an independent agency dedicated to civil 
defense.^
A three-part objective, captured in the motto “Survive, Recover, and Win,” 
energized the new unit.^ Four functions guided early civil defense planning: “(1) 
measures designed to prevent an enemy attack; (2) measures designed to reduce the 
effects of an enemy attack; (3) services which will alleviate the damage of an enemy 
attack; (4) and general measures pertaining to the overall program.”  ^ The new 
administration faced a number of challenges during its early days. The appointment of 
Millard Caldwell as the first director of the FCDA angered the NAACP and other
 ^ “History o f Civil Defense,” President’s Secretary’s File (PSF); Box 193, Civil Defense, Harry S. 
Truman Library (HSTL). Activities during World War II included things like victory gardens, salvage 
drives, and air-raid drills.
“History o f Civil Defense,” PSF; Box 193, Civil Defense, HSTL.
 ^Ibid.
®Ibid.
 ^Corey Brewer, Civil Defense in the United States: Federal State and Local. (Library of 
Congress Legislative Reference Service, Washington: I95I), iv.
* Spencer R. Weart, “History o f American Attitudes Toward Civil Defense,” in Civil Defense: A 
Choice o f Disasters, edited by John Dowling and Evans M. Harrell. (New York: American Institute of 
Physics, 1987), 13.
 ^Brewer, 4.
progressive groups because of racist statements he made as Florida governor."* Letters to 
the White House about Caldwell’s appointment questioned his commitment to protect all 
Americans.”  The FCDA also faced constant cuts in its budget from Congress. In 1951, 
Congress funded civil defense efforts at $65 million, rather than the $535 million 
requested by the FCDA citing claims that real protection of civilians would be far too 
costly and the best hope was “to altogether avoid war.” *^  President Truman called 
Congress’ allocation “tragically insufficient.”'^ Such statements became routine at the 
FCDA. In 1952, the president called the ninety percent reduction in allocation a repeat of 
a “gross error.” '"* Millard Caldwell likened the 1953 appropriations to Russian roulette.'^ 
Failure to obtain adequate funding from Congress prompted the FCDA to enter into a 
number of partnerships with industry and other groups to spread its message of 
preparedness.
Civil defense material between 1950 and 1963 largely appealed to Americans’ 
sense of patriotic duty by framing preparedness as a measure of good citizenship and 
offered little technical information about survival. The messages offered by the FCDA 
through the Ad Council, civic groups, and business others all made important 
associations between civil defense and good citizenship as they equated characteristics
Andrew Grossman, “Segregationist Liberalism; The NAACP and Resistance to Civil-Defense 
Planning in the Early Cold War, 1951 - 1 9 5 3 International Journal o f  Politics, Culture, and Society. 13:3 
(2000).
" Numerous examples can be found in the White House Central Files (WHCF): OF (Official File) 
2965, HSTL. The majority o f letters were form letters used by members o f NAACP branches across the 
United States.
“Bomb Shelters Away,” Time, September 3, 1951.
Statement by the President, November 2, 1951; PSF; Box 193, Historical File, 1945-1953,
HSTL.
Statement by the President, July 15, 1952; PSF; Box 193, Historical File, 1945-1953, HSTL.
Federal Civil Defense Administration, “Press Information no. 257,” Spencer R. Quick Files 
(Quick Files); Box 6, Civil Defense Campaign - General (1), HSTL.
such as civic-mindedness, homeownership, and family togetherness with survival. These 
messages can help us better understand the ways that civil defense helped domesticate the 
doomsday destruction of the Cold War.
Throughout the 1950s, because of an inability to secure funding sufficient to 
establish a more active civil defense program, the FCDA focused on the relatively 
inexpensive process of distributing information to Americans about the possibility of 
survival through home preparedness. In 1953 and 1955, the FCDA participated in test 
operations at the Nevada Test Site. Following the tests, the FCDA released books and 
movies for the public urging them to undertake civil defense measures in their homes. In 
1954 and 1955, a new understanding of the harmful nature of fallout and changing 
technology including long-range missiles and exponentially more powerful bombs altered 
civil defense policy. Instead of assuming that the primary threat to the population would 
come from heat and blast wave, it became evident that the increased destructive power of 
the H-bomb would necessitate evacuation from targeted areas. By the mid-1950s, civil 
defense virtually disappeared from national conversation as the Cold War stabilized and 
the American public focused their attention on the expanding economy.
Civil defense re-entered national debate in the early 1960s as Americans, faced 
with the Bay of Pigs invasion and the Cuban Missile Crisis, recognized the renewed 
possibility of nuclear war. Home fallout shelters were marketed as the best bet for 
survival and dealers sprang up around the country to sell backyard shelters to suburban 
families. Articles in mass media publications addressed the moral cost of fallout shelters 
and questioned what type of world would greet survivors on their emergence. The fervor
surrounding the fallout shelter was short-lived, however, and by 1963 the market for 
fallout shelters collapsed.
Limited scholarly attention has been paid to the development of American civil 
defense. A number of books on the Cold War examine it only in passing as part of 
domestic Cold War programs and the influence of the atomic bomb on 1950s American 
culture.'^ Other authors examine the ways civil defense interacted with changing notions 
of gender and family in postwar America through a system of “domestic containment.”'® 
Other works focus on the institutional development and policies of the FCDA and its 
successors.'^ These books, along with a handful of articles, represent the extent of
'** Scholars who focus on postwar America largely ignore civil defense, but their works provide 
important context for understanding postwar American culture. One o f the most useful books on postwar 
America is Lizabeth Cohen’s A Consumer’s Republic: the Politics o f  Mass Consumption In Postwar 
America. Her analysis o f postwar America and the connections between citizenship and consumption 
offers a useful framework for relating civil defense to American politics. She argues that mass 
consumption effectively set the dimensions of postwar society.
These include: Paul Boyer, By the Bomb’s Early Light: American Thought and Culture at the 
Dawn o f  the Atomic Age (New York: Pantheon, 1985); Stephen J. Whitfield, The Culture o f  the Cold War 
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1991); and Allan M. Winkler, Life Under a Cloud: American 
Anxiety about the Atom (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993).
The idea of domestic containment emerged from Elaine Tyler May’s Homeward Bound: 
American Families in the Cold War Era (New York: Basic Books, 1988), but a number o f subsequent 
authors have used her construction in examining the effects of the Cold War on American culture. Both 
Laura McEnaney, Civil Defense Begins at Home: Militarization Meets Everyday Life in the Fifties 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000); and Dee Garrison, Bracing fo r  Armageddon: Why Civil 
Defense Never Worked (Oxford: New York: Oxford University Press, 2006) have examined the 
relationship between gender and civil defense campaigns. Garrison’s work offers an important counter­
narrative to the existing scholarship. She advances a theory that civil defense played an important role in 
the strategy o f deterrence between the United States and the Soviet Union and skillfully relates domestic 
civil defense policies to international politics.
Andrew D. Grossman, Neither Dead nor Red Civilian Defense and American Political 
Development During the Early Cold War (New York: Routledge, 2001). Grossman provides important 
insight into the influence o f the FCDA, but his work is hindered by his denunciation o f other works on civil 
defense that focus on material culture. Kenneth D. Rose, One Nation Underground: A History o f  the 
Fallout Shelter (New York: New York University Press, 2004) places the fallout shelter at the center o f his 
analysis as he traces the development o f the American civil defense program. Guy Oakes, The Imaginary 
War: American Civil Defense and American Cold War Culture (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994) 
focuses on the disconnect between the official message of the FCDA, which held that survival was 
possible, and the awareness o f  government officials that nearly all efforts at survival would prove futile in 
case o f an attack.
scholarly literature on civil defense/^ They offer a valuable summary of the 
development and eventual demise of the national civil defense program. Some of them 
offer limited insight into the ways different groups, especially women, participated in 
organized civil defense efforts. Understanding the institutional development of the 
American civil defense program provides needed background, but the real importance of 
civil defense in the early years of the Cold War lies in the ways in intersected with 
broader American culture.
The evolution of civil defense between 1950 and 1963 is the focus o f this thesis 
because this period encompasses the rise and fall of home-based preparedness. The 
second chapter, “Survive, Recover, Win: Public Education Campaigns of the FCDA” 
uses documents, reports, and correspondence from the FCDA to trace the various 
methods the FCDA used to indoctrinate the public on the policy of civil defense. 
Although ostensibly about survival, the campaigns spread overt messages about what it 
meant to be a good American. Chapter three, “A Tough Sell: The Advertising Council 
and Civil Defense” examines the tensions between the FCDA and the Ad Council 
through correspondence between the Advertising Council, the FCDA, and the White 
House. This chapter also identifies the imagery and themes through which the 
advertisements connected preparedness and good citizenship. The design, promotion, 
and success of the largely forgotten Alert America exhibit are examined in the fourth 
chapter, “The Show You’ll Never Forget: The Alert America Convoy.” Drawing on 
archival materials from the Kenneth D. Wells collection at Brigham Young University,
JoAnne Brown, “A Is for Atom, B Is for Bomb: Civil Defense in American Education, 1948- 
1963,” Journal o f  American History 75, no. 1 (1988): 68-90; Sarah A. Lichtman, “Do-It-Yourself Security: 
Safety, Gender, and the Home Fallout Shelter in Cold War America.” Journal o f  Design History 19, no. 1 
(2006): 39-55; Guy Oakes and Andrew Grossman. “Managing Nuclear Terror: The Genesis of American 
Civil Defense Strategy,” International Journal o f  Politics, Culture, and Society 5, no. 3 (1992), 361-403.
the chapter traces the exhibit from its planning stages through its tour. Chapter four, 
“Dummy Doomtown in the Desert: Civil Defense and the Nevada Test Site,” details the 
relationship of the FCDA to the atomic bomb tests and the way the tests were used to 
further downplay the dangers of aboveground atomic weapons tests. Newspaper and 
magazine articles, official reports, television programs, and correspondence all provide 
important insight into the ways officials framed the tests for public consumption. 
Advertisements are the main source for the sixth chapter, “Purchasing Survival: 
Preparedness Products” and show how the roles of citizen and consumer overlapped in 
the postwar period. The final chapter, “Civil Defense Goes Underground: The Fallout 
Shelter,” focuses on the boom and bust of the fallout shelter market through 
advertisements and articles from newspapers and magazines.
This thesis will help us better understand the early years of the Cold War by 
showing how consumption became entwined with civic duty through the efforts of civil 
defense officials. The promotion of self-help as the main policy of preparedness 
effectively conflated the roles o f citizen and consumer. This exemplifies the important 
evolution in the definition of American citizenship that occurred in this period, as a new 
emphasis on consumption as a patriotic duty came to define what it meant to be a good 
American. By analyzing the ways civil defense was promoted by the government, 
business, and civic groups during the 1950s, this thesis exposes the relationship between 
Cold War politics and domestic culture, public and private lives, and demonstrates how 
the language of civil defense was used to mold public opinion on atomic weapons and in 
turn endorse the ongoing militarization o f American culture.
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CHAPTER 2
SURVIVE, RECOVER, WIN: PUBLIC EDUCATION CAMPAIGNS OF THE 
FEDERAL CIVIL DEFENSE ADMINISTRATION 
In 1950, the National Security Resources Board released the Cold W ar’s first 
book on civil defense. The United States Civil Defense Program?^ The book called for 
the creation of an independent federal agency for civil defense, argued that panic was the 
greatest problem facing civil defense planners, and placed the family at the center of 
preparedness.^^ In a departure from World War Il-era civil defense planning that focused 
on community efforts, an insistence on the family as the core of civil defense efforts 
guided survival planning throughout the 1950s and early 1960s. The book presented 
readers with a graphic representation of family-centered civil defense planning, labeled 
the National Civil Defense Pattern. The image, made up of concentric rings, went from 
the federal government, to the state, nearby cities, community, neighborhood, and ended 
with the family and individual in the middle.^^ According to the chart, the family was the 
“base of organized self-protection” and the individual was “calm and well-trained.” The 
characterization of civil defense as primarily an individual effort partly reflected
Executive Office of the President, National Security Resources Board, United States Civil 
Defense (Washington: GPO, 1950). The book is also known as the “Blue Book” because o f  the color o f its 
cover. The NSRB took civil defense on as a responsibility in March o f 1949. Harry B. Yoshpe, Our 
Missing Shield: The US Civil Defense Program in Historical Perspective (Prepared for Federal Emergency 
Management Agency: April 1981), 520.
^  Guy Oakes, The Imaginary War: American Civil Defense and American Cold War Culture 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1994), 38.
Executive Office o f the President, National Security Resources Board, United States Civil 
Defense (Washington: GPO, 1950), 2.
II
planners’ recognition that money for defense was largely directed toward active 
measures, such as weapons building and the development of early warning systems. 
While the focus on the family may have been a pragmatic solution for NSRB planners 
because of their limited funds, it also reflected the concurrent shift in American culture 
toward the nuclear family.
La
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Figure 2— The National Civil Defense pattern from the NSRB's United States Civil Defense Program
United States Civil Defense Program and other materials produced by the FCDA 
identified a clear intended audience. Preparedness efforts focused on suburban nuclear 
families while ignoring Americans in urban areas. By emphasizing a program of self- 
help in which individual families purchased items meant to aid in their survival at local 
stores, the FCDA connected consumption and patriotism. Despite ongoing internal 
conflict at the FCDA between the message that survival was possible and a recognition
12
that most efforts at preparedness would prove futile, the administration produced a 
consistent stream of materials for public consumption that held that American families 
could survive an atomic attack by practicing self-help measures. Examining the public 
information campaigns of the FCDA reveals one way that civil defense contributed to the 
hegemony of the Cold War consensus.
A desire to create a consensus developed in the late 1940s and business, 
policymakers, and the mass media united to indoctrinate Americans about the “benefits 
of the American way of life.” "^* They framed the American system of free enterprise in 
opposition to the Soviet totalitarianism and linked democracy with affluence. The 
concept of consensus also attempted to ascribe narrow gender roles for men and women, 
define acceptable public discourse, and located autonomy for Americans in their role as 
consumers in the free market. These groups saw this consensus as the foundation for 
ever-growing American affluence and power and as the key to an “egalitarian and 
harmonious s o c i e t y . T h e  public information campaigns were used to educate 
Americans about their role in this consensus-driven society. The cynical response of 
Americans to many of the FCDA’s efforts suggests that the consensus of the postwar 
period was more imagined than lived.
Even after the creation of the FCDA at the federal level in 1950, civil defense 
planning remained primarily a local issue. Official federal policy held that responsibility 
for preparedness belonged to individual states. The federal role was one of “planning, 
coordination, and guidance,” while the states were the responsible for the operation of
Daniel Horowitz, The Anxieties o f  Affluence: Critiques o f  American Consumer Culture, 1939- 
1979 (Amherst; University of Massachusetts Press, 2004), 7.
Ibid.
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civil defense/^ Since the federal role was limited to such hands-off duties, it allowed the 
FCDA to focus most of their efforts on public education campaigns and to promote civil 
defense mainly as a project of self-help to Americans. These public education campaigns 
took the form of booklets, pamphlets, television and radio spots, posters, and exhibits. 
Distributed by the FCDA to local civil defense offices and the public, these materials 
presented a consistent message aimed at suburban families that survival was possible and 
that their participation in civil defense would lead to a stronger America.
Two objectives guided the FCDA’s public education campaign. The first 
objective, “To develop a general acceptance of civil defense as a necessary, permanent 
element of our total national defense, without hysteria and independent of the ups and 
downs of international relations” attempted to orient civil defense as a permanent part of 
American society.^^ A focus on citizens’ responsibility was the core of the second 
objective as it aimed to “to produce a sober, routine readiness in all American families, 
based on indoctrination and public exercises, to the point where prompt and effective 
survival action becomes automatic.” ®^ These objectives led to two distinct goals for civil 
defense planners. First, policymakers aimed for preparedness planning independent of 
international politics. The second objective, indoctrination, became the main focus as the 
FCDA attempted to convert the domestic homefront into a Cold War battlefield. Lack of 
funds and little interest in the program by politicians limited the ability o f the FCDA to 
reach either objective.
Federal Civil Defense Administration, 1952 Annual Report, (Washington: GPO, 1953), 1. 
Federal Civil Defense Administration, 1955 Annual Report, (Washington; GPO, 1956), 72. 
Ibid.
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In order to instruct Americans about their role in civil defense the FCDA entered 
into a number of partnerships. Officials on the national level worked with newspapers, 
magazines, television, and radio to spread the message that survival was possible. The 
FCDA lauded these relationships and claimed that “making the facts of survival 
understood, believed, and remembered by millions of Americans” would have been 
impossible without the participation of mass media.^^ The partnerships the FCDA 
formed with the mass media largely determined the scope and content of preparedness 
information.
The FCDA issued booklets, pamphlets, and other publications to educate the 
public about their role in civil defense. Materials for the general public emphasized the 
policy of self-help in ensuring survival of families. The majority of publications focused 
on families at home and paid little attention to the very real possibility that family 
members might be apart at the time of attack. While these materials focused on the 
survival of the atomic bomb blast with little attention to post-blast society, materials 
produced for professional groups focused on the real devastation of a post-attack city.
The divergence in the messages of these two types of publications is important because 
the level o f destruction presented for public consumption is significantly lower than that 
presented to those responsible for recovery efforts. Examining the publications of the 
FCDA reveal important insight into the ideology of the administration and the ways they 
married the notion of family survival with victory for the United States in World War III.
Shortly after the establishment of the FCDA, the administration began producing 
materials for American families on the importance of practicing good civil defense within
Federal Civil Defense Administration, 1952 Annual Report, (Washington; GPO, 1953), 41.
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their homes. These publications reiterated the policy of self-help and encouraged 
families to take steps needed to ensure their survival and help create a strong America. 
Nearly all FCDA publications also carried the message that preparedness could deter a 
Soviet attack because the population would recover quickly and defeat the communists. 
Civil defense publications often featured families on the cover and detailed steps for each 
member in preparing for a possible attack.®** In these pamphlets, the dangers of atomic 
attack were downplayed, and American families were guaranteed survival by completing 
basic preparedness measures. One example of such pamphlets. Six Steps to Survival, 
featured a family on the cover and asked, “If  an Enemy Attacked Today Would You 
Know What to Do?”®’ Inside, the FCDA listed six steps for survival; prepare family for 
emergencies, learn civil defense signals, know CONELRAD stations, follow the 
evacuation guide, construct a home shelter, and read about fallout. On the back cover, 
the same family stood secure in their knowledge that they were prepared to survive an 
atomic attack. Other materials drove home the message that survival planning for 
families was not only important to protect them in case of an atomic attack, but in making 
America stronger. One example. What You Can Do Now, contained the civil defense 
pledge and explicitly made the case on the front cover with an image of the family 
reading the pamphlet accompanied by the text, “for a stronger America.”®^ FCDA 
publications for the public focused on the family as the core of civil defense. Pamphlets 
such as these “stressed the metaphoric bond between self and nation” and equated the
Examples include Federal Civil Defense Administration, Before Disaster Strikes: What to Do 
Know About Emergency Sanitation at Home, (Washington; GPO, 1953); Home Protection Exercises, 
(Washington; GPO, \95€), Rural Family Defense, (Washington; GPO, 1956), and Corner Room Shelter fo r  
Family Protection in an Atomic Attack, (Washington; GPO, 1953).
Federal Civil Defense Administration, Six Steps to Survival, (Washington; GPO, 1956).
Federal Civil Defense Administration, What You Can Do Now, (Washington; GPO, 1956).
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survival o f the family with the victory o f the United States in the Cold War.®® The 
equation of middle-class families with a Cold War victory in these publications, with 
their focus on suburban families, consisting of parents and a son and daughter, illustrate 
one way that the messages of the FCDA helped inform the consensus of the period.
The FCDA created materials with messages catered to the intended audience. In 
addition to the campaigns aimed at American families, the FCDA produced publications 
meant for groups such as clergy, doctors, dentists, welfare professionals, and the police. 
Most of these materials carried a bleak message about the realities of atomic attack and 
the need for trained professionals to tend to the masses following an attack.®"* These 
publications stand in stark contrast to the optimistic message that survival was possible 
offered in materials meant for the general population.
Comparing these two types of materials illustrates an important contradiction in 
FCDA policy. A pamphlet meant for those responsible for post-attack society. The 
Welfare Task in Civil Defense, had a particularly grim cover.®  ^ Against the backdrop o f a 
mushroom cloud, a long line o f people streamed out a destroyed town on the front cover. 
At the front o f a line, a man carried a child while another child walked in front o f him 
carrying a baby. The people’s clothing hung in shreds around them. This drawing o f the
Robert A. Jacobs, “There are No Civilians; We Are All at War’: Nuclear War Shelter and 
Survival Narratives During the Early Cold War,” Journal o f  American Culture 30:4, 401.
Examples include: Federal Civil Defense Administration, Before Disaster Strikes: What the 
Farmer Should Know About Biological Warfare (Washington: GPO, 1955); FCDA, 10 Steps to Industrial 
Survival (Washington: GPO, 1956); Federal Civil Defense Administration, Basic Course in Emergency 
Mass Feeding (Washington: GPO, 1957); the Federal Civil Defense Administration also produced booklets 
for various professionals including doctors, dentists, veterinarians, fire fighters, and engineers.
Federal Civil Defense Administration, The Welfare Task in Civil Defense. (Washington: GPO, 
1953). Federal Civil Defense Administration, “For Your Information: Public Affairs #60: The Welfare 
Task in Civil Defense,” May 22, 1953; James M. Lambie Records (Lambie Records); Box 3, Civil Defense 
- General 1953 (2), DDEL. A press release described “The Welfare Task” as “a pictorial -text 
representation o f the four components of CD-emergency services— mass care, registration and information, 
temporary rehabilitation aid, and evacuation.”
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destruction of an atomic bomb is in direct conflict with other messages offered by the 
FCDA for public consumption. A pamphlet meant for the general public published in 
1955, Facts About Fallout, showed a much rosier picture of post-attack America.^^ On 
the cover of that pamphlet, a man stood in front of a mushroom cloud holding his 
briefcase with a bewildered look, but the cover does not convey nearly the same level of 
destruction or suffering as The Welfare Task in Civil Defense. The two covers both show 
an America that has just been the target of an atomic bomb with the mushroom cloud still 
lingering in the background, but the stark contrast in the level of destruction points to the 
differing messages for the general public and those meant to respond to an attack. The 
very different scenes o f post-attack American shown on these two covers demonstrate the 
tension inherent in the FCDA’s public information mission. Two important concepts 
guided civil defense planners: the official line that claimed Americans could survive an 
attack while privately they recognized the futility o f civil defense e f f o r t s . T h i s  tension 
manifest itself in the dramatically different covers; civil defense informational materials 
meant for public consumption offered a carefully cultivated optimistic message that 
cleaved to the notion that survival was possible, while those meant for individuals meant 
to aid in the recovery effort recognized the very real danger of atomic attack.
Federal Civil Defense Administration, Facts About Fallout, (Washington: GPO, 1955). 
Interestingly, this was published in 1955, after the government released information about the very real 
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Figure 3- The Welfare Task in Civil Defense, 1953 Figure 4- Facts about Fallout, 1955
In addition to the publication and distribution of informational materials, civil 
defense officials created a number of campaigns in partnership with various companies 
and manufacturers to educate the public. In such cooperative campaigns, the civil 
defense message appeared in space donated by businesses, publishers, or in buildings. 
The non-profit Advertising Council created a series of public-service campaigns to raise 
awareness of civil defense measures. That campaign is examined in the next chapter.
Not only did the FCDA rely on the might of the Ad Council to sell the message of 
preparedness, but the administration also encouraged private companies to take part in 
the effort. Officials asked stores that sold products related to civil defense to display 
posters about volunteer recruitment. The FCDA requested that companies manufacturing
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preparedness products to include information about the official civil defense program in 
advertising materials. Such encouragement created conflict within the FCDA, however, 
as technical planners expressed concern about the accuracy of claims and messages made 
in private ads.^^ The Administration also partnered with manufacturers to spread its 
message in more unusual ways. One example was the insertion of FCDA alert cards in 
new wallets and billfolds by the producer o f these g o o d s . T h e s e  campaigns 
demonstrate the ingenuity of the FCDA in finding new ways to reach the public. This 
cooperation may not have been the first choice of officials, but their anemic budget made 
such creative promotion a necessity. Campaigns such as these bombarded Americans 
with the message of survival through preparedness in the marketplace.
Civil defense officials also used more graphical forms to spread the message of 
survival. The Alert America exhibit in 1952 was by far the largest exhibition, but the 
FCDA also created smaller exhibits that used a variety o f tools to educate Americans 
about the need for civil defense including posters and maps showing potential destruction 
under black lights for display at conventions, trade shows, fairs, and other events.'^*’ 
Additionally, the FCDA developed posters to aid in education and recruitment. Similar 
in style to World War II posters, the FCDA commissioned two series of civil defense 
posters in 1952. Officials meant for them to be displayed in a variety of locations 
including store windows, civil defense offices, theater lobbies, factory corridors, and
Letter by Ed Lyman, August 8, 1951; Quiek Files; Box 2, Civil Defense Program, HSTL.
Federal Civil Defense Administration, 1953 Annual Report, (Washington; GPO, 1954), 74. 
This campaign differs from later efforts by private companies and businesses to impart civil defense 
information to customers. The wallet card campaign was in partnership with the FCDA in contrast to the 
later campaigns that were undertaken independently by companies.
40 Produces Variety of Exhibits for Public,” Civil Defense Alert, August 1952, 2. Federal
Civil Defense Administration, 1952 Annual Report, (Washington: GPO, 1953), 52. Federal Civil Defense 
Administration, 1953 Annual Report, (Washington: GPO, 1954), 74.
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television backdrops. When displayed as a unit the posters formed a forty-foot narrative 
about the need for civil defense.'*' The first series, “Alert America,” consisted of twelve 
posters that told the “basic civil defense s t o r y . P o s t e r  messages included: “Enemy 
Target no.l- Civilians,” “To Win- the enemy must smash our production,” “Make no 
mistake-civilians can be bombed,” “ 150 Million Alert Americans are a mighty force for 
peace,” and “Your vigilance is the price of your freedom.” The second series consisted 
of ten posters focused on the recruitment o f volunteers. Each one highlighted a different 
activity and encouraged Americans to join the important civil defense effort. Jobs listed 
included post-attack welfare and health service and police and fire rescue. The FCDA 
reported that they distributed 40,000 sets of the posters.'*^ Posters offered a valuable 
resource for civil defense officials because they were relatively inexpensive to produce 
and quickly communicated their message. Just as World War II posters called on every 
American to take part in the war effort through activities like buying war bonds and 
planting victory gardens, the “Alert America” series of posters called on citizens to 
become the front-line troops of the Cold War. One poster, “ 150 Million Alert Americans 
are a mighty force for peace,” told Americans that their participation in civil defense 
could serve as a deterrent to Soviet attack and prevent World War III. FCDA officials, 
many o f whom came from the World War II Office of War Information, skillfully crafted 
posters to compel Americans to volunteer for civil defense. These posters clearly 
invoked the Cold War and contrasted the opportunity of American capitalism with the
“FCDA Produces Variety o f Exhibits for Public,” Civil Defense Alert, August 1952, 2.
Federal Civil Defense Administration, “The Federal Civil Defense Administration presents 
Signs o f Our Times,” (Washington; GPO, 1952); Lambie Records; Box 3, Civil Defense - General 1953 
(2), DDEL.
Federal Civil Defense Administration, 1952 Annual Report, (Washington: GPO, 1953), 53.
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oppression of Soviet communism. One of the most striking posters, “Enemy Target no.
1- Civilians,” showed an iron fist crushing an American town complete with factories and 
homes. The poster explicitly showed viewers that the home front was no longer safe 
from enemy attack and that American families must take an active role to ensure a strong 
America. The other posters in the series carried similar themes. Driving home the 
message that total war was an imminent possibility, these posters illustrate the real unease 
of the early Cold War.
Figure 5- 1952 Poster from the Federal Civil Defense Administration 
Harry S. Truman Presidential Library and Museum
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The FCDA saw popular press magazines as another avenue to reach the public. 
Officials wrote editorials and other content for the magazines. Bylines for the articles 
varied; they were sometimes attributed to the FCDA, but also appeared as content 
generated by the magazine, or as a public service article. One example appeared in 1953 
when Val Peterson, then head of the FCDA, wrote an article for Collier’s magazine, 
“Panic: The Ultimate Weapon?” Widely read, the FCDA republished it and sent it out 
from their offices.'*'* Other magazines including Life, Newsweek, Redbook, Saturday 
Evening Post, and Time, heeded the call of the FCDA and published positive articles 
about US civil defense. The FCDA sent out a kit, “The Ever Present Danger,” to 
magazine editors asking them to support the campaign. In a letter accompanying the kit. 
Acting Administrator Wadsworth of the FCDA claimed, “Civil Defense stands as a co­
equal partner with the military defense. If both are sufficiently strong—they can help 
stave off World War III.”'*^ The kit included items he hoped editors would “find it 
possible to use” in “many future issues” including “quotable quotes” on civil defense 
from military and political leaders, suggested editorials, fillers, slogans, and a fact sheet 
on the program.'*® The position of the FCDA expressed in the kit, that civil defense stood 
as a co-equal partner to military defense, failed to take hold in mainstream media, but 
editors did regularly publish features extolling readers to volunteer for civil defense and 
prepare their homes and families. The distribution of “The Ever Present Danger” and the
Val Peterson, “Panic, the Ultimate Weapon?” Collier’s, August 21, 1953, 99; “‘Panic’ Article 
Available as Booklet,” For Your Information, newsletter of the FCDA, December 28, 1953.
Federal Civil Defense Administration, “The Ever Present Danger; A Magazine Program for the 
Self-Protection of the American People through Civil Defense,” Lambie Records; Box 3, Civil Defense - 
General 1953 (2), DDEL.
Ibid.
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willingness of magazine publishers to devote space to the message that with preparation 
an atomic bomb could be survived helped to inject civil defense as part of postwar 
American discourse in a way that pamphlets from the local or national civil defense 
office could not.
The FCDA recognized the power of television in reaching Americans as 
television ownership increased dramatically in the 1950s. The FCDA distributed footage 
from atomic bomb tests at the Nevada Test Site to further the message of self-help as the 
key to survival.'*^ The Advertising Council sponsored live coverage of the 1953 test 
program “to alert citizens to the need for civilian defense activities, the donation of blood 
for civilian emergency stockpiles and stimulation of the Ground Observer Corps.”'*® The 
FCDA applauded the live coverage because it “brought home to millions of Americans 
not only the tremendous destructive force o f an atomic blast, but also offered visual proof 
that a family can survive by taking simple precautions.”'*^  In addition to the live footage, 
the FCDA collaborated with film production companies to distribute films summarizing 
the test program.^® The FCDA cooperated with “private industry, foundations, and trade 
associations in the production of sponsored public service films on civil defense.” *^
These sponsored films followed the “cooperative promotion” model of the FCDA and 
furthered the association between official civil defense efforts and the marketplace. The 
FCDA provided educational films about civil defense to television stations. One such
74 .
'*’ Federal Civil Defense Administration, 1953 Annual Report, (Washington: GPO, 1954), 70 and
Advertising Council, Annual Report, 1952-53, (New York: Advertising Council, 1953), 6. 




program, “Survival,” by the FCDA played to an estimated 12 million viewers in 1951.®  ^
Television stations also ran one-minute promotional spots for civil defense that featured 
celebrities such as Lucille Ball, George Bums, and Jack Benny/^ Civil defense planners 
used television in order to infiltrate American homes with the message of survival. This 
emphasis on television dovetailed with “the installation [of television] into domestic 
space in the years following World War II.”®'* Television producers and civil defense 
policymakers largely imagined the same audience for their productions: the suburban, 
white middle class. Reflecting planner’s assumption that the suburban middle class was 
their primary audience for public education, they linked preparedness with two other 
important trends of the era, consumption and togetherness, through television.
While the FCDA devoted significant attention to magazine and television, they 
also developed content for use on the radio. Radio material primarily consisted of brief 
spots educating Americans about the need for civil defense. The ABC radio network 
aired weekly spots on civil defense awareness.®® Radio stations carried advertisements 
promoting the program voiced by stars such as Bing Crosby, Amos and Andy, and Art 
Linkletter.®® The FCDA, through the Ad Council, provided stations a “Radio Fact Sheet” 
with talking points on the civil defense program and directions to “indicate that an air
An ad promoting the program was sent to stations across the country asking them to book the 
program “Civil Defense Offers Survival,” Quick Files; Box 6, Civil Defense Campaign - General (1), 
HSTL. See also Paul Boyer’s discussion o f the program Paul Boyer, By the Bom b’s Early Light: American 
Thought and Culture at the Dawn o f the Atomic Age (New York: Pantheon, 1985), 325.
Federal Civil Defense Administration, 1955 Annual Report, (Washington: GPO, 1956), 78.
Lynn Spigel, Make Room for TV: Television and the Family Ideal in Postwar America 
(Chicago: University o f Chicago Press, 1992), 1.
Federal Civil Defense Administration, 1953 Annual Report, (Washington: GPO, 1956), 71.
Federal Civil Defense Administration, 1955 Annual Report, (Washington: GPO, 1956), 76.
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attack be survived” and a caution to avoid “scare copy.”®’ In the mid-1950s, the 
FCDA’s interest in radio shifted into the implementation of the CONELRAD emergency 
broadcast system.
FCDA-issued publications as well as the cooperative campaigns in magazines, 
radio, and television all carried the same underlying message that an atomic attack could 
be survived through family-based preparation. The survival of American families was 
identified as victory for the United States in the Cold War. The slogan of the FCDA, 
“Survive, Recover, and Win,” implied that the administration was concerned with both 
survival and recovery, but the majority of public information campaigns focused solely 
on survival as the key to victory. The FCDA, by framing civil defense as an individual 
effort, helped connect the Cold War to everyday American domestic experiences like 
shopping, house cleaning, and food preparation. The optimistic message o f the FCDA 
lived on beyond the pages of their booklets as the emphasis on self-help and the family 
informed discussions about survival until 1963.
Radio Fact Sheet, no. 54, Advertising Council; Lambie Records; Box 3, Civil Defense - 
General 1953 (1), Dwight D. Eisenhower Presidential Library (DDEL).
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CHAPTER 3
A TOUGH SELL: THE ADVERTISING COUNCIL 
AND CIVIL DEFENSE 
Just months after its establishment as an independent agency, the Federal Civil 
Defense Administration contracted with the Advertising Council to promote their cause. 
The partnership was fraught with tension and the campaign never reached the prominence 
of some of the Ad Council’s other public service efforts. Examining the relationship 
between the FCDA, the Ad Council, and the executive branch reveals several tensions 
that determined the nature of civil defense promotion in the 1950s. A close reading of 
the advertisements created by the Ad Council exposed many of the beliefs planners held 
about civil defense, including who the perceived constituents for preparedness were and 
what survival and victory would look like for the United States.
The history of the Advertising Council and civil defense has two important 
strains: the relationship between the FCDA and the Ad Council and the evolution of the 
campaigns developed by the Ad Council. The working relationship between the Ad 
Council and the FCDA was tense from the beginning of their partnership. The 
involvement of the White House public affairs division further strained the relationship. 
The tension originated from a fundamental disagreement about how the civil defense 
campaign should best be sold to the American public. The Advertising Council argued 
for a campaign that called for concrete action based on their expert knowledge of
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advertising theory. The FCDA wanted a campaign that increased awareness of civil 
defense and enhanced the reputation of civil defense workers and volunteers. Both the 
FCDA and the Ad Council saw these two approaches as fundamentally incompatible. 
Executives at the Ad Council took offense at the FCDA’s insistence that they knew better 
how to sell preparedness. The second strain, the content of the Advertising Council 
campaigns for civil defense, illustrates a number of important themes that were used in 
selling survival. Close reading of the advertisements show how the Ad Council and the 
FCDA conceptualized civil defense as the ads consistently relied on anti-communist 
sentiment and images of home and family to stimulate interest in preparedness. While 
the partnership between the Ad Council and the FCDA lasted only five years, it 
influenced later efforts by private groups to promote civil defense. The difficulties in 
their relationship also reveal important debates that took place outside of the public eye 
about the meaning of civil defense in postwar America.
Formed originally in 1941, the Advertising Council worked with the Office of 
War Information during World War II to create advertisements for rationing, war bonds, 
victory gardens, and other domestic programs meant to support the war effort. After the 
American victory in World War II, the Council remained a force in American culture and 
politics and created campaigns focused on American victory in the Cold War.®® Leaders 
of the Council summed up their feelings on their role in post-World War II America by
Secondary literature on the Advertising Council is surprisingly lacking. The main scholarship 
on the Ad Council is; Robert Griffith, “The Selling o f America: The Advertising Council and American 
Politics, 1942-1960,” Business History Review, 57, No. 3 (1983), 388-412; Robert Jackall and Janice M. 
Hirota, The Image Makers: Advertising, Public Relations, and the Ethos o f  Advocacy (Chicago: University 
of Chicago Press, 2000); Daniel Lykins, From Total War to Total Diplomacy: The Advertising Council and 
the Construction o f  the Cold War Consensus (Westport: Praeger Publishers, 2003); and Robert H. Zieger, 
“The Paradox o f Plenty: The Advertising Council and the Post-Sputnik Crisis,” Advertising and Society 
Review 4:1 (2003).
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saying, “The war never stopped. Only the enemy has changed.”®^ Their 1950-51 Annual 
Report traced the history of the Ad Council’s as dealing with the problems of “war, 
peace, and semi-war.”®® This quote shows the important arc of the Ad Council over these 
years as they moved from their origin during World War II, to a focus on reconversion 
during the peace between 1945 and 1950, and finally their view that once again they were 
engaged in a semi-war with their involvement in domestic campaigns related to the Cold 
War. Over the course of the 1950s, the Advertising Council developed many new public 
service campaigns. The Ad Council’s main energies in the first years of the 1950s 
focused on the related campaigns of promoting free enterprise and educating Americans 
about the Cold War.®'
“Deeply aware of the serious injury a surprise enemy attack could do to our 
national strength and ability,” FCDA officials asked the Advertising Council to take on 
the cause of civil defense in 1951.®’ The Council agreed and assigned the campaign to 
the advertising firm of Batten, Barton, Durstine, and Osbom (BBD&O), with Edward 
Gerbic of Johnson and Johnson as the volunteer coordinator.®® The staff of the 
Advertising Council functioned as a go-between for the FCDA, the White House Public 
Affairs Office, and the advertising executives who actually designed the campaign 
materials. Advertising Council staff constantly had to mediate between the different
“Matters of Choice,” 10. From www.adcouncil.org. last accessed 7-May-07.
Advertising Council, Annual Report, 1950-51, (New York: Advertising Council, 1951), 3.
“Matters of Choice,” 41. Some o f the main campaigns in the early 1950s were care packages to 
European countries ravaged in World War II, blood drives, get out the vote, blood drives, and brotherhood. 
See also, “Ad Council Where it Came In,” Business Week, October II, 1952, 136-8.
Advertising Council, Annual Report, 1951-52, (New York: Advertising Council, 1952), 24.
Ibid. Batten, Barton, Durstine, and Osbom (BBD&O) founded in early part o f the twentieth 
century became one o f the most important advertising agencies, pioneering campaigns for such large 
companies as Ford and Pepsi.
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interests of the White House Public Affairs Office and the FCDA, and nearly always took 
the side of the executive branch. For example, they reduced size of the campaigns 
despite regular pleading by the FCDA for larger campaigns in order to appease the 
desires o f the White House. The constant compromise led to campaigns for civil defense 
that were dramatically smaller in scope and content than imagined by the FCDA.
The relationship between the FCDA and the Advertising Council got off to a 
rocky start. A memorandum about a meeting on April 24, 1951 referred to the attitude of 
the FCDA’s public affair director. Jack DeChant, as “antagonistic.”®'* This tension 
contributed to delays in communication and misunderstandings throughout the next five 
years of their partnership. Though the relationship was not helped by personality 
conflicts between FCDA officials and Ad Council staff, the real source of the tension was 
more the fundamental difference in opinions on the best way to market civil defense. The 
Advertising Council’s position reflected the larger American skepticism toward civil 
defense. Further, the failure of both the Truman and Eisenhower administrations to 
embrace fully the cause of civil defense left the FCDA to scramble for funding 
throughout the 1950s. Ad Council executives recognized that without support of the 
White House, the FCDA could not possibly attain the level of prestige FCDA officials 
wanted. These difficulties led to a strained relationship between the two groups. 
Correspondence between the Ad Council, the FCDA, and the White House address much 
of this tension and reveal the ways it limited the possibilities for a continued relationship 
between the two groups.
Allan Wilson to Charles Jackson, August 14, 1951; Quick Files; Box 6, Civil Defense 
Campaign- Correspondence, 1951-53, HSTL.
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While neither President Truman nor Eisenhower took an interest in fully funding 
civil defense, both administrations’ public affairs divisions took an interest in the public 
materials distributed by the FCDA. Their interest repeatedly interfered with the aims of 
the FCDA. Charles Jackson of the White House Public Affairs Office killed the FCDA’s 
dream for a large campaign based on his belief that advertising was most effective when 
it demanded concrete action from the reader such as buying a particular product. He 
went on to tell the FCDA that they could not recommend a campaign “which has as its 
sole objective ‘alert America’.” We have to suggest something for the reader to do.”®® 
The opposing positions of the FCDA and the White House Public Affairs Office point to 
two very different understanding of what the nature of civil defense ought to be during 
the early 1950s. Just as the FCDA constantly struggled to stay afloat with its paltry 
budget, the lack of support from the White House Public Affairs Office shows just how 
little faith the Executive branch placed in civil defense during the first half of the decade.
In addition to the differing opinions about the appropriate scope of the civil 
defense campaign, the Ad Council and FCDA debated the most effective forms of 
advertisements. Composed of members from some of the biggest advertising agencies in 
America, the Ad Council had a clear idea of what made advertisements compelling. The 
FCDA also had determined what types of advertisements they deemed most effective at 
selling civil defense and desired a large campaign focused on increasing awareness about 
preparedness efforts. FCDA officials viewed the reluctance of the Advertising Council to 
embark on a large prestige campaign for civil defense as a personal rebuff, when it more 
accurately reflected a difference in ideology about effective advertising.
Memorandum Charles Jackson to James M. Lambie, April 15, 1953; Lambie Records; Box 3, 
CD Civil Defense - Campaign - Correspondence 1953 (1), DDEL.
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Once the Ad Council, the FCDA, and the White House Public Affairs Office 
came to a compromise about the best form and scale for the civil defense campaign, a 
new conflict emerged about the actual content of the advertisements. The Advertising 
Council rejected the optimism of the FCDA’s public information campaign and saw civil 
defense as a grim reality of the Atomic Age. FCDA officials conversely believed that the 
cause of civil defense ought to be one of long-term importance, independent of the 
international climate. J.M. Chambers of the FCDA public affairs office wrote to Allan 
Wilson of the Ad Council about the way civil defense ought to be promoted. He said, “If, 
instead of keeping people in a perpetual state of alert, we try to sell civil defense on a 
calm, long-range, common sense basis, we must convince people that what the nation 
should strive for is not merely to build a military machine but to achieve total national 
security.”®® The Ad Council did not believe that their efforts could aid in building long­
term support for the cause. Ed Gerbic, the coordinator o f the campaign, argued that there 
was little that could be done through the Ad Council to help the FCDA or enhance the 
reputation of civil defense workers.®’ The White House agreed with the Advertising 
Council’s stance that they could do little to aid the cause and encouraged the FCDA to 
seek partnerships with those who sold civil defense products to help in that endeavor.®® 
The Ad Council and the FCDA could not compromise their difference on the content of 
the campaign and it led to a limited effort by the Ad Council on behalf of civil defense. 
Understanding the conflict between the FCDA, the Truman and Eisenhower
^ J.M. Chambers to Allan Wilson, February 27, 1953; Lambie Records; Box 3, Civil Defense - 
General 1953 (1), DDEL.
Memorandum for Charles Jackson on March 2, 1953 meeting between FCDA/AC, March 4, 
1953; Lambie Records; Box 3, Civil Defense - General 1953 (1), DDEL.
Memorandum Charles Jackson to James M. Lambie, April 15, 1953; Lambie Records; Box 3, 
Civil Defense - Campaign - Correspondence 1953 (1), DDEL.
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administrations, and the Ad Council provides important background to the campaigns 
that were mounted on behalf of civil defense. These campaigns, despite the behind-the- 
scenes fighting, consciously made a case for preparedness that relied on an implicit, and 
in some cases explicit, connection between civil defense and good citizenship.
Despite the squabbling between the Ad Council and the FCDA, BBD&O moved 
quickly on creating a campaign for civil defense once the two agencies reached a 
compromise. This first campaign centered on volunteer recruitment. FCDA officials 
thought of it as the begirming saying, “It will have to be followed— or rather, dovetail 
into— a long-range campaign to sell civil defense as a permanent part o f community 
planning, of which advertising admittedly could not be expected to carry the full load.”®^ 
While the FCDA saw the recruitment campaign as only a start, the Ad Council and the 
White House Public Affairs Office viewed it as a sufficient effort to educate people about 
the need for civil defense. Civil defense officials asked the Ad Council and White House 
for support for a larger, more prestigious campaign over the next three years, but were 
denied each time. The desire of civil defense planners to create a much larger campaign 
partly represented their mandate to educate the public, but also points to a very different 
conception of civil defense than that of the White House and Congress. The FCDA 
conceived of civil defense as an ongoing effort, independent of larger political issues.
This view failed to take hold outside the FCDA as the Advertising Council’s limited 
interest in the cause suggests.
The Volunteer Recruitment campaign went live shortly after its creation by 
BBD&O. Radio spots for civil defense aired between April-July of 1951 on programs
^ Memorandum of meeting between FCDA public affairs and Advertising Council: “Preliminary 
run-through o f BBD&O materials,” May 29, 1951; Quick Files; Box 2, Civil Defense Program, HSTL.
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such as Boxing Bouts, Rogue’s Gallery, and the Gene Autry show with such sponsors as 
General Mills, Gillette Safety Razor, and Proctor and Gamble among other companies.’® 
The development of these public service ads established a link between preparedness 
education and the marketplace that remained throughout the decade. Even once the 
Advertising Council severed ties with the FCDA, companies continued to provide space 
to educate the public about survival. Radio allocations for the campaign ended abruptly, 
however, when Ad Council executives, frustrated with the slow movement of the FCDA 
on approving the newspaper mat portion of the recruitment campaign debated the 
effectiveness of the radio spots.’* The end of the Ad Council radio program, due largely 
to the frustration of the Ad Council with the FCDA, reveals the way that the inter-agency 
tension hindered the civil defense campaign.
The momentum of the campaign was further crippled when the Ad Council 
denied requests for car cards for the civil defense campaign. Car cards, printed posters 
usually eleven by twenty-eight inches, were placed on busses, trains, and other modes of 
public transportation.’® Both public service and commercial advertisers used car cards to 
reach the public. Ed Gerbic, the volunteer coordinator for the campaign, wrote to Charles 
Jackson of the White House Public Affairs Office that the civil defense campaign had 
been discouraging and further quashed the FCDA’s hopes for a larger campaign saying, 
“We feel certain that a national prestige campaign or a campaign designed to sell Civil 
Defense as an established way of life would have little or no chance for support by the 
industries and organizations that would have to finance the ads, in view of the present
™ Ibid.
Advertising Council, “Report of Civil Defense Campaign for 1951,” Jan. 15,1952; Lambie 
Records; Box 52, Advertising Council - Government Campaigns, DDEL.
Edward J. Rowse, Fundamentals o f  Advertising (Cincinnati: Southwestern, 1950), 265.
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national climate.”’® The Ad Council explicitly rejected the notion of the FCDA that civil 
defense ought to be an ongoing part o f life for the United States and instead focused their 
efforts on campaigns they felt were more relevant to the current political climate. The 
campaigns of the Ad Council changed swiftly to reflect changing times and rarely did 
campaigns continue beyond a few-year span.’'*
Following the distribution of the Volunteer Recruitment kit, The FCDA requested 
that the Advertising Council create a more prominent campaign for civil defense 
awareness. So-called “prestige campaigns” were used mainly to boost the reputation of a 
cause or an organization.’® A prestige campaign would enhance the reputation of civil 
defense volunteers and workers and would take place on a much larger scale than the 
recruitment campaign. In November of 1951, the Advertising Council rejected the idea 
saying that a prestige campaign’s “Pollyanna-like character that did not befit the 
seriousness, not to say the grimness, of FCDA’s responsibilities.”’® Rebuffs such as 
these went against the FCDA’s own message civil defense ought to be a national priority 
no matter the international climate and certainly against the measured optimism of their 
own materials. At the end of 1951, the Advertising Council recommended that the civil 
defense campaign be held in abeyance and focused their efforts on other campaigns such 
as Better Schools, American Economic System, Student Nurse Recruitment, and Prevent
Edward Gerbic to Charles W. Jackson, August 3, 1951; Quick Files; Box 2, Civil Defense 
Program, HSTL.
Well-known campaigns such as Prevent Forest Fires and the American Red Cross are 
exceptions to this rule. Most Ad Council campaigns lasted for only three years.
The main prestige campaigns the Ad Council took on were for the various branches o f the 
armed forces. Quick Files; Box 1, Armed Forces - Prestige Campaign - Infantry, I95I; Armed Forces - 
Prestige Campaign - WAC 1951, HSTL.
Memorandum of meeting of Advertising Council and BBD&O, Nov. 6, I95I; Quick Files; Box 
2, Civil Defense Program, HSTL.
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Forest Fires.”  The Civil Defense campaign continued on hold throughout 1952 as the 
Ad Council questioned the need for the campaign, “it is in sort o f a limbo until a real 
need for the Council’s aid reveals itself.”’®
During the break in the civil defense campaign, FCDA officials continued to 
squabble with the Ad Council about how the concept o f civil defense could best be sold 
to the American public. Henry Wehde from the Ad Council countered the FCDA’s 
claims by saying that that they understood the importance of civil defense “but in light of 
what is good and effective advertising it was felt that the Council could produce, from the 
standpoint of results and sponsorship, the most success on those programs which urge 
concrete and simple actions rather than on those which have as their sole objective the 
changing of public conceptions.”’  ^ Wehde went on to say, “Thus it is our considered 
opinion that although advertisements could most certainly be prepared to stress to the 
consumer and business executive the importance and significance of Civil Defense. Such 
an ‘understanding’ campaign would not attract widespread sponsorship and not produce 
appreciable results.”®® He concluded his letter by saying that the campaign for civil 
defense ought only to be reactivated by the Council when the legislative and executive 
branches “will lead the way into arousing public interest and confidence in Civil Defense 
and when the FCDA can suggest simple and concise actions that advertising can urge
Advertising Council, “Report o f Civil Defense Campaign for 1951,” Jan. 15, 1952; Lambie 
Records; Box 52, Advertising Council - Government Campaigns, DDEL; Advertising Council, 
“Mobilization-Public Interest Campaigns,” October 1951; Files o f Charles W. Jackson (Jackson Files); 
Box 16, Advertising Council Publications and General, HSTL.
Allan Wilson to Charles Jackson, Feb, 6. 1952; Quick Files; Box 6, Civil Defense Campaign- 
Correspondence, 1951-53, HSTL.
Henry Wehde to Spencer Quick, July 31, 1952; Quick Files; Box 6, Civil Defense Campaign- 
Industrial, HSTL. Most revealing are the comments handwritten on the letter, several points are 
underlined with NUTS written next to them.
“  Ibid.
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upon the individual.”®' Wehde’s lengthy letter summarized the position of the 
Advertising Council. While the FCDA took offense at the Ad Council’s position, the 
concerns of the Council executives more accurately reflected the apathy of the American 
public at the time to the concept of civil defense.
After realizing the limits of the Ad Council’s interest in their cause, the FCDA 
embraced the Volunteer Recruitment kit. The main portion of the kit consisted of a 
newspaper mat campaign. A letter that accompanied the kit claimed, “recruiting is a job 
for advertising and publicity.” ®® The bulk of the kit consisted of ads to be used in 
newspapers and periodicals. The campaign stalled out, however, because, according to 
Henry Wehde of the Ad Council, “1952 was an election year and hence the policy of the 
federal government in regard to Civil Defense was somewhat fluid, it was the decision of 
the Council’s task force with the full realization of the importance of this program, to 
defer action until the situation stabilized.”®®
The contention surrounding the design of the Volunteer Recruitment Kit set the 
terms for the civil defense campaign. While such tension certainly colored the form of 
the campaign, the real importance of the campaign is in the messages the advertisements 
set forth. The main goal of the campaign was recruitment of volunteers, but the ads had 
other aims as well. The ads all contained blatant anti-communist, pro-democracy 
imagery. They also depicted a remarkably homogenous America, consisting solely of 
white, middle-class, suburban Americans. The ads included in the packet provide
Ibid.
^^Advertising Council, Civil Defense Volunteer Recruiting Kit, Federal Civil Defense 
Administration,” Record Series 13/02/207, File #576, Advertising Council Archives, University o f Illinois 
Archives.
Advertising Council, Annual Report, 1952-53, (New York: Advertising Council, 1953), 18.
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significant insight into the way civil defense officials imagined its constituency in the 
early years of the Cold War. The underlying theme of each of the ads is an implicit, and 
in some cases, explicit, connection between civil defense and good citizenship. For 
example, a number o f ads included authority figures from the military with statements 
about the importance of preparation. Other ads used images of servicemen to promote 
the importance of home front preparedness. The main theme in the volunteer packet is 
that civil defense ought to be carried out by individuals and their families, at home, and 
that survival was possible with moderate preparation in case of an atomic attack. Most 
importantly, the fate of America rested squarely on the shoulders of individual Americans 
in all of the ads.
One of the ads included in the kit embodies a number of these themes. The ad 
used images of three white, middle-class couples. The first image featured a sullen 
couple, accompanied by the text, “Pessimists say, “What’s the use?” The second image 
is of a smiling couple, the optimists, who say, “What’s the Rush?” The third, and largest, 
image on the page is of a man reading the newspaper, with his smiling wife beside him. 
Underneath their picture the ad read, “Good citizens say, “How can we help?” The ad 
played out many of themes of civil defense during the early years of the Cold War. 
Preparedness was identified as an effort to be taken by yourself at home with your family. 
A portion of the text read, “The difference between preparedness and unpreparedness 
could mean survival... for you, your family, your city... yes, even survival for 
America.”®'*
^''Advertising Council, Civil Defense Volunteer Recruiting Kit, Federal Civil Defense 
Administration,” Record Series 13/02/207, File #576, Advertising Council Archives, University o f Illinois 
Archives.
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This advertisement neatly shows the ways in which the FCDA imagined its 
constituency and the ways the message of civil defense focused on the home as a crucial 
site of defense. All three couples appear to be middle-class and squarely fit into the 
homogeneous world of civil defense. The youngest couple, the optimists, appears as 
though they have yet to learn important lessons. Both the pessimists and good citizens 
are middle-aged, but the good citizens are affluent and fashionable. The husband is 
reading the newspaper, suggesting he stays well informed. The imagery of the ad, with 
the three couples in their own living rooms graphically reinforced the message that the 
home front is the first line of defense in the Cold War. The good citizens pictured in 
front of their fireplace embody the best of America; they are educated, successful, and 
realistic.
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Figure 6- Civil Defense Volunteer Recruitment Kit, 1951
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Several ads in the Recruitment Kit used images o f women and family to showcase 
the pressing need for civil defense awareness to defend America. Ads meant to appeal 
specifically to women, however, offer a more complicated picture of the relationship of 
women to the broader civil defense program than identified by scholarship.®® One ad 
featured a large image of a married woman in a business suit wearing a civil defense 
armband. The woman appears confident and serious. The text says, “There’s an 
important job for every woman in civil defense.” Underneath the larger text are a series 
of questions including, “Can you drive a car? Run an office? Cook?” The ad then goes 
on to encourage women to donate time to local civil defense efforts. Beneath the large 
image of the woman, six smaller images recreate possible scenarios for civil defense 
volunteers. The jobs represented are warden, nurse, welfare service, drivers, office staff, 
and communications service.
This ad presents a more complicated relationship between women and civil 
defense in the early years of the Cold War than allowed for in existing scholarship. The 
ad differs from traditional accounts because while it appeals to women’s maternal 
instincts, it allows women flexibility in their roles as wives and mothers to become 
invaluable members of the recovery effort. It also recalls many of the important jobs 
women took as paid labor during World War II. These images, rather than simply 
marrying matemalism and the militarization of American society, created additional 
opportunities for women in civil defense outside of childcare or nursing. Women, 
according to this ad, are useful to civil defense because they are rational human beings.
The advertisement offers an important complication to the argument o f domestic containment 
set forth by Elaine Tyler May’s Homeward Bound: American Families in the Cold War Era (New York: 
Basic Books, 1988). May sees postwar culture using the Cold War and civil defense to define narrow roles 
for women as mothers.
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not because of any innate feminine capability. While other ads certainly used images of 
family to stress the need for adequate defense, they largely included both men and 
women, suggesting that instead of a campaign to enlist mothers, civil defense was more 
broadly a campaign to enlist families.
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Figure 7- Civil Defense Volunteer Recruitment Kit, 1951
The relationship between the FCDA and the Ad Council remained icy following 
the release of the Volunteer Recruitment Kit. In 1952, the Ad Council approved another 
civil defense campaign consisting solely of promotional materials for the Alert America
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convoy.®® The Alert America convoy traveled the nation in 1952 in an attempt to meet 
the twin objectives of the FCDA’s public education efforts by both educating Americans 
about the need for civil defense and recruiting volunteers and is discussed in more detail 
in the next chapter. The Advertising Council devoted their resources to other campaigns 
such as “American Economic System,” “Armed Forces Blood Program,” “Prevent Forest 
Fires,” “US Defense Bonds,” and “American Heritage.”®’ All of these campaigns spread 
important messages about America and used the language of the Cold War to call for 
domestic action. Most of these campaigns have long since been forgotten, but the way 
that they flooded the airwaves, billboards, and print media show how a particular image 
of America was carefully constructed and codified during the postwar period. While the 
civil defense campaign failed to gamer the level of interest of some of other Ad Council 
campaigns, it too spread important messages about the meaning of America and the Cold 
War.
In 1953, the tensions between the Advertising Council and the FCDA lessened 
when the incoming Eisenhower administration replaced Jack DeChant as the FCDA 
Public Affair director.®® The aims of the civil defense campaign also changed as it 
moved away from volunteer recruitment and focused on first aid readiness for American 
homes and industry.®^ This change is important as it moved the emphasis from direct 
action, through volunteering, to a more passive form of preparedness focused in one’s
^ Advertising Council, “Report of Civil Defense Campaign for 1951,” Jan. 15, 1952; Lambie 
Records; Box 52, Advertising Council - Government Campaigns, DDEL.
Advertising Council, “Mobilization-Public Interest Campaigns,” May 1952; Jackson Files; Box 
15, Advertising Council- Monthly Summaries of Activities [3 o f 3- November 1949-May 1952], HSTL.
** Status Report- July 1952-January 1953, Government Public Service Campaigns, Federal Civil 
Defense Administration, Lambie Records; Box 3, Civil Defense - Campaign - Correspondence 1953 (2), 
DDEL.
89 Advertising Council, Annual Report, 1953-54, (New York: Advertising Council, 1954), 18.
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own home. It also reflected in a broader downturn in the national discussion of civil 
defense. BBD&O developed two newspaper kits to support the new campaign, A 
Campaign to Save Lives if  Disaster Strikes: H ere’s A Kit That Will Help You Protect The 
People o f Your Community and A Campaign to Save Lives if  Disaster Strikes: H ere’s a 
Kit that Will Help Business and Industry Prepare fo r Disaster?^ The two new campaigns 
did little to impart to Americans the crucial need for civil defense because of the threat of 
atomic war, and instead framed civil defense as a more general policy of preparedness for 
whatever disaster may come.
The new campaigns for civil defense were far different from the prestigious 
campaign originally called for by the FCDA. The reactivation of the civil defense 
campaign focused on basic first aid and the maintenance of a well-stocked medicine 
cabinet with checklists of products needed to insure survival. Much to the 
disappointment of the FCDA, the Ad Council conceived the campaign as one on a local 
level with local sponsors, lacking the prestige of other Ad Council campaigns.^’ The 
First Aid kit began with letter to advertisers from Val Peterson that included a quote from 
President Eisenhower that emphasized self-help as the first step o f survival saying, “The 
first of these home exercises is perhaps the simplest and most necessary -  having 
adequate first aid supplies on hand and knowing how to use them through a free Red
^ Advertising Council, A Campaign to Save Lives if  Disaster Strikes: H ere’s a K it that will help 
you protect the people o f  your community and A Campaign to Save Lives if  Disaster Strikes: H ere’s a Kit 
that will help Business and Industry Prepare fo r Disaster, Record Series 13/02/207, File #671, 
Advertising Council Archives, University o f Illinois Archives.
Advertising Council, “Call Report,” May 1, 1953; Lambie Records; Box 3, Civil Defense -  
General 1953 (2), DDEL.
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Cross first aid course.”^^  Another letter in the kit from Ed Gerbic called on advertisers to 
support the campaign saying, “Public apathy and indecision about civil defense is a 
serious gap in America’s defense. They not only tempt an enemy to attack, but would 
also increase the possibility that such an attack on our population and industrial might 
would be devastating and decisive. A weak civil defense could lose us the peace... it 
would lose us a war.”^^  One of the most striking ads centered on a drawing of a pencil. 
Beneath the pencil the text read, “This pencil may save your life.” On the bottom, it 
included a checklist of products including bandages, antiseptic, and water purification 
t a b l e t s . I n  addition to the newspaper kit, the Advertising Council made the booklet. 
Emergency Action to Save Lives available over drugstore c o u n t e r s . T h e  book carried a 
note on its back cover granting permission to any “responsible organization, institution, 
individual, or concern which wishes to republish it for free distribution, legitimate 
promotional purposes, or for sale.”^^  The first-aid campaign relied heavily on 
sponsorships of companies that produced the items called for on the checklist. This 
campaign, for the first time, explicitly made a connection between manufacturers and 
civil defense education. This connection caused anxiety within the FCDA, as they 
debated whether or not to list medications by their brand names or their generic scientific 
names, fearing the brand name would be seen as an endorsement of the product. The 
FCDA decided to use the generic names much to the displeasure of storeowners who
^ Advertising Council, “A Campaign To Save Lives If Disaster Strikes; Here’s A Kit That Will 
Help You Protect The People Of Your Community” (Washington: GPO, 1953); Lambie Records; Box 12, 
Civil Defense - General 1958, DDEL.
"Ibid.
Advertising Coxmcil, Annual Report, 1953-54, (New York: Advertising Council, 1954), 18.
^  Federal Civil Defense Administration, Emergency Action to Save Lives, (Washington: GPO,
1951).
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claimed difficulty in assisting customers in finding the products. While earlier public 
service advertisements for civil defense appeared on donated space mainly in newspapers 
or radio programs, they were not linked to a particular company or manufacturer that had 
a monetary interest in preparedness. With the first aid campaign, the Ad Council and the 
FCDA made deals with companies that had a financial interest in the purchase of these 
products. This relationship set the stage for later informational campaigns sponsored by 
business and corporations that occurred outside the purview of the FCDA, but sought to 
educate the public, partially to gain goodwill but also to inspire the purchase of their 
product.
The move by the FCDA to an industrial campaign offered an important revision 
of earlier campaigns that emphasized self-protection in the home. The campaign for 
business and industry focused on the protection of America’s vital industries and their 
employees. The kit contained advertisements aimed at executives and stressed the need 
for disaster p l ann i ng . Nea r l y  all the advertisements featured businessmen, ignorant to 
the threat of atomic attack. It connected America’s ongoing prosperity with industry. It 
urged preparation by companies so that they could reopen soon after attack and their 
contribution to America’s war effort.
By the mid-1950s, a new understanding of fallout altered civil defense policy and 
the FCDA realized the challenges inherent in promoting the new preparedness plans. 
Policymakers recognized evacuation of targeted cities as the best form of civil defense, 
but quickly realized that such a radical plan would have to be sold to the American
Advertising Council, A Campaign to Save Lives if  Disaster Strikes: H ere’s A Kit That Will Help 
You Protect The People O f Your Community, (Washington: GPO, 1953); Lambie Records; Box 3, Civil 
Defense - General 1953 (3), DDEL.
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public.^^ Even the FCDA conceded that it would be a tough sell because patterns of 
fallout and evacuation routes would make standardized directions impossible.^^ The Ad 
Council concurred and, for the first time, the two agencies agreed on the direction of a 
new campaign with materials focused on a “broad scale, national program, the purpose of 
which would be to win public understanding of the threats we face and the defense 
against them- and public participation in tests of evacuation and other tactics which offer 
our best chance of survival if  attack c o m e s . W h i l e  the Ad Council and the FCDA 
agreed on the goal of the campaign, the actual campaign produced by the Ad Council 
tempered the idea somewhat and focused solely on the implementation of the 
CONELRAD alert system. CONELRAD was developed in the early 1950s as a 
comprehensive alert system and outlet for official civil defense instructions. The FCDA 
saw a need to educate Americans to memorize the CONELRAD frequencies and to seek 
it out in case of an emergency. While the sudden harmony between the Ad Council and 
the FCDA initially seems surprising, the change in philosophy for civil defense planning 
fell more in line with the skills of the Ad Council. With a shift toward evacuation and a 
recognition that education campaigns would have to be localized, the FCDA was forced 
to concede that the best campaign would have to aim for simple action. Instead of any 
kind o f large-scale prestige or awareness campaign, the new campaign focused simply on 
awareness of the CONELRAD alert system.
CONELRAD reused many of the same tropes present in the first large campaign 
civil defense campaign, the Volunteer Recruitment kit. The packet contained a letter





from Val Peterson, the head of the FCDA that held that “a strong America stands as a 
barrier to aggression. A weak America would invite national suicide.” '”' The campaign 
had as its aim “to impress on every citizen that if  attack threatens he can find out where to 
go and what to do by tuning in on the emergency frequencies of 640 and 1240 
kilocycles.”' ”^  The kit contained a number o f advertisements that linked the 
CONELRAD broadcast with survival for American families. The most powerful ads 
featured families coming under surprise attack and an admonishment to remember to turn 
to the radio in times of emergency.
One of the most visually striking advertisements created for the campaign 
featured a family sitting around a kitchen table eating breakfast. The family consisted of 
a father in a business suit, a boy, a girl, and a mother serving breakfast. As the family 
enjoyed their breakfast, the ad implied that they are vulnerable to an attack. In the lower 
right hand comer of the image, three planes drop bombs. Beneath the image, the copy 
read, “If an enemy attacked right now would you know what to do?” The ad contained 
information about the CONELRAD alert system that would broadcast information in case 
of attack. In a complete reversal of earlier goals, the ad does not call for any kind of 
volunteerism in civil defense activities. It simply encouraged readers to write for the 
civil defense booklet. Six Steps to Survival
Advertising Council, CONELRAD, Record Series 13/02/207, File #744, Advertising Council 
Archives, University o f Illinois Archives.
Ibid.
Ibid. Interestingly, requests were not made to any administrator or office in particular; rather 
they were to be addressed simply to “Survival.”
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If an enemy attacked right now
would you know what to do?
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Figure 8- Advertising Councii, CONELRAD, 1955.
This advertisement and others in the kit used images o f family to appeal to the 
emotions of Americans. This ad contained a disconnect between the image and the text. 
The imagery offered a frightening proposition: that Soviet attack could come at any time, 
anywhere. The text however offered a surprisingly calm command to remember to tune 
into the radio. It says, “There’s just one thing to remember— and it could save your life 
and the lives of your family. It is this: GO TO YOUR RADIO and tune in 640 or
I24o_”104
Advertising Council, Civil Defense Volunteer Recruiting Kit, Federal Civil Defense 
Administration,” Record Series 13/02/207, File #576, Advertising Council Archives, University o f Illinois 
Archives.
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The content of the CONELRAD kit illustrates the trajectory in the relationship 
between the FCDA and the Ad Council. The move from the Volunteer Recruitment Kit, 
to First Aid, and eventually to the CONELRAD campaign all represented the FCDA’s 
concessions to the Ad Council’s favored type of ads. The FCDA finally recognized the 
value o f ads that urged simple actions. It also marked the last campaign undertaken 
explicitly for the cause of civil defense by the Ad Council. In 1960, civil defense 
officials, then housed in the Office of Civil Defense and Management, asked the 
Advertising Council to create a campaign about the need for fallout shelters. The 
Council rejected the campaign because it would be an impossible sell, that it “would be 
an immensely difficult job even in the case of a shooting war. Lacking such an obvious 
danger, it would be necessary for the highest officials of government to warn solemnly 
and repeatedly that this must be done.”' ”^  While fallout shelters briefly became an 
important element of the civil defense program under the Kennedy Administration, the 
Advertising Council failed to show any interest in the promotion of the new shelter 
policy.
Tensions between the FCDA and the Ad Council soured their relationship 
throughout the 1950s. The two groups consistently had different ideas about the best 
method to promote survival. Even after the Eisenhower administration took office and 
the personal tensions abated somewhat, Ad Council executives did not hesitate to let their 
feelings be known about the FCDA’s policies. One such incident took place in 1956, 
when Ad Council executives expressed outrage over the FCDA’s new booklet and radio
Theodore Repplier to James M. Lambie, Aug. 15, 1960; Lambie Records; Box 56, Office of 
Civil and Defense Mobilization 1960, DDEL.
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spot for “Four Wheels to Survival.” '”” The spot and booklet claimed that the personal 
automobile could provide shelter in case of an attack and could also be used for 
evacuation and then as a living space.'”’ The Advertising Council’s outrage over the 
pamphlet demonstrates how far apart the FCDA and the Ad Council diverged on the 
policy of civil defense. Not only did the Ad Council believe that they knew how to sell 
civil defense most effectively, but they also opposed FCDA policy. This incident 
illustrates the rejection of the optimism of the FCDA by the Ad Council, a rejection that 
made their relationship nearly impossible. Although personality conflicts led to some of 
the tension between the Ad Council and the FCDA, the Ad Council’s reluctance to take 
on the campaigns requested by the FCDA reflected more their knowledge and insight into 
the American public as advertisers than any vendetta against the FCDA. The Ad 
Council’s position accurately reflected the dominant culture of the time and the apathy of 
not only the American public, but also the executive branch toward civil defense.
Without overwhelming support of public officials, it seems nearly impossible that civil 
defense could ever reach the level of prestige that its leaders imagined and hoped for the 
policy.
As short-lived and tense as the relationship between the FCDA and the Ad 
Council was, it allowed for an institutionalization of civil defense in the marketplace. It 
set up and encouraged many of the relationships that would continue throughout the 
1950s between private companies and local civil defense agencies. The public service 
campaigns created by the Advertising Council used nuclear, white, suburban families to
Notes between James Lambie and Harold Rosenberg, October 18, 1956; Lambie Records; Box 
27, Civil Defense Administration, Federal - Correspondence 1956, DDEL.
™ McEnaney, 55.
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represent America, effectively eliminating class and ethnic differences. The narrow 
image of America as conceptualized by the Advertising Council helps show one way that 
the consensus of the early Cold War was deliberately structured and carefully maintained. 
These public service campaigns illustrate how the federal government, through the power 
of advertising, helped frame the national debate about preparedness.
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CHAPTER 4
THE SHOW YOU’LL NEVER FORGET:
THE ALERT AMERICA CONVOY 
In 1952, three ten-truck convoys carried the Alert America exhibit to cities across 
United States with the mission of inspiring interest in civil defense. US Senator Margaret 
Chase Smith authored an editorial in January of that year urging readers to visit the 
convoy when it visited their towns. Smith decried the fact that the American people and 
congress had to be sold “a bill of goods on civilian defense” and compared the exhibit to 
an advertising campaign writing, the “Alert America convoys are basically nothing more 
than educational advertising and an attempt to do a selling job to the American 
people.” '”  ^ Smith’s editorial neatly summed up the imagined role for the convoy, that it 
would travel the country visiting targeted cities and encourage people to volunteer for the 
civil defense agency in their hometowns and increase the prominence of the Federal Civil 
Defense Administration in the eyes of Congress. While the mission of the Alert America 
campaign was straightforward, the design and content of the exhibit strove to brand civil 
defense as a fundamental component of the American way of life.
The Alert America Convoy followed in the tracks of the Freedom Train, an 
exhibit that traveled across the United States after World War II. A number of groups 
came together to create and sponsor the train, including civic groups, advertisers, mass
Margaret Chase Smith, “Alert America,” Oakland Tribune, January 24, 1952, D48.
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media, and the federal government. The Freedom Train encouraged Americans to 
rededicate themselves to their country and carried in it various historical documents 
including the Bill of Rights, Constitution, Declaration of Independence, Emancipation 
Proclamation, and artifacts from World War II including the Iwo Jima flag and surrender 
documents from Japan and Germany. The train served as the forerunner for the Alert 
America exhibit and as a “model for those who sought to elevate American patriotism 
and Cold War consciousness.”' ””
Edward Burdick, the designer behind the 1939 New York’s World Fair and the 
Freedom Train, designed the Alert America exhibit."” The Federal Civil Defense 
Administration sponsored the exhibit, while donations largely financed its construction 
and operation. Kenneth Wells of the non-profit Freedoms Foundation oversaw the free 
exhibit. Crisscrossing the nation, the exhibit distributed information on how to prepare 
for an atomic attack and peaceable uses of atomic energy. Wells hoped that the Alert 
America campaign would emphasize that civil defense was an important part of “the free 
American way of life based as it is on a fundamental belief in God, on constitutional 
government designed to serve the people, and our indivisible bundle of political and 
economic rights.”" '  The Alert America exhibit offered an image of civil defense aligned 
with Cold War patriotism while asserting that atomic weapons could be managed and 
beat by modest preparation.
Richard M. Fried, The Russians are coming! The Russians are Coming! Pageantry and 
Patriotism in Cold-War America (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998), 28. Fried’s discussion o f the 
planning o f the Freedom Train exhibit and the debates that surrounded the selection of artifacts for display 
shows just how contested meanings o f what it meant to be an American in the years immediately following 
World War 11 were.
™ New York Times, January 19, 1952, 5.
Kenneth D. Wells, “The Alert America Convoys: Campaign Book.” Kenneth D. Wells 
Collection; 20* and 2U' Century Western and Mormon Americana; L. Tom Perry Special Collections, 
Harold B. Lee Library, Brigham Young University, MSS 1503, Box 3, Folder 2, Book 3. p.3.
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The FCDA adopted “Alert America” as the slogan for their public information 
campaign in 1951 with the goal of informing “the American people of their grave danger 
and the need for Civil Defense for protection.”"^ Two goals guided the public education 
campaign: first, to inform Americans about the fundamentals of self-protection and 
second, to enlist Americans as volunteers for civil defense."^ The FCDA conceived of 
two major components o f the public education campaign, both relying on the cooperation 
of private industry for their implementation: the Advertising Council’s development of 
public information campaigns and the Alert America convoy. The Alert America 
convoy aimed to “give a living, visible, dramatic action to the urgent but intangible 
concept of civil defense.”" ” According to official materials, the Alert America exhibit 
aimed to convince Americans of the reality of the Soviet threat and that “civil defense is 
every citizen’s duty.” ' It also had the ambitious goal o f enlisting fifteen million 
volunteers for civil defense."’ The Alert America exhibit functioned as one part of 
massive public information campaign by the FCDA that included advertising campaigns, 
movies, television and radio spots, and various publications. More so than the other 
components. Alert America explicitly linked civil defense with the Cold War conception 
o f American patriotism.
In 1951, the FCDA asked the Freedoms Foundation at Valley Forge to take on the 
task of developing a traveling exhibit to stimulate interest in civil defense. The Freedoms
112 Alert America campaign, Progress Report. WHCF; OF, File 1591C, Alert America, HSTL.
Ibid.
Ibid.
“The What and How o f the Alert America Campaign,” LTPSC, BYU, MSS 1503, Box 3, Fid I.
“The Civil Defense Alert America Convoy: The Show that may save your life,” WHCF: OF, 
File 2965, Federal Civil Defense Administration, 1952-53, HSTL.
""Ibid.
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Foundations, founded in 1949 by General Eisenhower, Kenneth Wells, and other 
prominent politicians and business leaders, aimed to enhance and protect the “American 
way of life.”"* The Freedoms Foundation advocated for conservative economic policies 
and embarked on campaigns to educate Americans about the Constitution and free 
enterprise system ."” The Freedoms Foundation created a separate entity, the Valley 
Forge Foundation, to design and build the massive exhibit. Kenneth Wells, then 
president of the Freedoms Foundation, took the head role in the Valley Forge 
Foundation.'^”
The patriotic conservatism of the Freedoms Foundation colored the design and 
content of the exhibit. Kenneth Wells, in his position as head of the Valley Forge 
Foundation, sought to imbue the exhibit with piety and patriotism.'^' His statements 
about the convoy positioned civil defense as a crucial component of the American way of 
life by conflating anti-communism and preparedness. Wells identified a clear enemy to 
the American way of life that constantly guided his thoughts about the Alert America 
convoy, he wrote that The Enemy (his emphasis) seeks to destroy all “we hold dearest in 
life, our freedoms, our ideals, our moral standards, our spiritual v a l u e s . T h e  FCDA’s 
partnership with the Freedoms Foundation unequivocally linked civil defense with larger
Richard M. Fried, The Russians are coming! The Russians are Coming! Pageantry and 
Patriotism in Cold-War America (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998), 21.
"'Ibid.
Fried, 46.
The Truman Administration remained frigid to Wells’ despite his involvement with the Alert 
America campaign. He sent a copy of a souvenir book from the Alert America exhibit to the White House 
for the president’s signature it was returned unsigned because Wells was an “eager beaver” and “General’s 
Boy.” HST, Cross-reference Sheet, December 6, 1952; WHCF: OF, File 1591C, Alert America.
Kenneth D. Wells, “The Alert America Convoys: Campaign Book.” LTPSC, BYU, MSS 1503, 
Box 3, Folder 2, Book 3. p. 7.
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conservative political trends of the early 1950s such as anti-communism, practicing of 
religion, and a belief in the benefits of free enterprise.
While the Alert America exhibit primarily focused on the need for civil defense, it 
also featured a section on the peaceful uses of atomic energy. This juxtaposition at first 
seems a contradiction, but points to the dual role of the atom in the early years of the 
Cold War. While the atomic bomb launched an age of uncertainty and possible total 
destruction, it also heralded in the “Atomic Age,” a period of rapid technological 
advances and seemingly endless possibilities. Alert America was by far the largest 
example of the way in which the propaganda about the peaceful possibilities of atomic 
energy collided with warnings about the destructive power of atomic weaponry, but not 
the first of such exhibits. In 1950 and 1951, fairs and exhibitions across the United States 
included atomic energy displays. Oak Ridge Institute of Nuclear Studies offered up 
exhibits on atomic energy to state fairs. The exhibits demonstrated the splitting of 
uranium atoms, a cartoon on atomic energy, samples o f radioactive plants, and an 
“exhibit of radioactive frogs in a Lucite-enclosed pool” with a Geiger counter of the pool 
so spectators could identify the radioactive f r o g s . T h e  Oak Ridge exhibit was 
displayed at the Long Beach Exposition in California surrounded by circus acts, a home 
show, and the other expected components of a fair. The Oak Ridge exhibit, in addition to 
detailing the wonders of atomic energy, offered a “thrilling demonstration” on “how a 
family escapes under atomic attack.” '^ "' Another example of this type of exhibit was
123 ,
124
‘Institute Will Show Nuclear Phenomena at State Fairs,” Los Angeles Times, August I, 1950,
Los Angeles Times, July 20, 1951, 13. The advertisement for the show is quite visually 
striking. The background is taken up by a mushroom cloud with a box in front of it with two clowns touts 
the “star-studded circus and exposition.”
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Westinghouse’s “The Theatre of the Atom” built for the Chicago Fair in 1950. It 
included “a three-dimensional atom model, a miniature atom-smasher, an electrostatic 
‘atomic’ motor, a ‘mousetrap’ bomb, and other exhibits to explain atomic energy.'^”
New York City hosted an atomic energy show in 1951, billed as the “most complete 
demonstration of atomic energy ever assembled.”'^” The exhibit focused on the 
peacetime uses of atomic energy but also offered “instructions on individual defense 
against atom b o m b s . E x h i b i t s  celebrating the wonders of the atom were designed to 
satisfy people’s curiosity about atomic energy.'^* These exhibits focused on the wonders 
of the Atomic Age and the possibility of atomic energy to transform completely the 
American way of life. The novelty surrounding the atom during the first part of the 
decade contributed to difficulties in communicating the real dangers posed by atomic war 
and led to tension between the celebratory tone of exhibits on atomic energy and the 
much more serious exhibits on the need for civil defense.
Just as the FCDA recognized that civil defense as policy needed to be sold, the 
Valley Forge foundation saw a need for promotion before the convoy arrived to “arouse 
the greatest possible interest in it.” Wells urged people to “capitalize on the “Alert
“Plans Model Atom Show,” New York Times, June 4, 1950, F8; “Fair to Show How Atomic 
Forces Work,” Chicago Tribune, April 18, 1950, 1.
“Atom Energy Shows Opens Here Today,” New York Times, May 14, 1951, 16.
Ibid.
At the Chicago Fair, visitors to the Westinghouse exhibit were given cards to fill out for a 
drawing for a set of Encyclopedia Britannica. The winning card was the one that was radioactive when 
placed under a Geiger counter. “Radioactive Card to Reveal Winner at Fair,” Chicago Tribune, July 4, 
1950, A4.
Kenneth D. Wells, “The Alert America Campaign For Your Community.” LTPSC, BYU MSS 
1503, Box 3, Folder 1, p.5 The draft o f this statement said that the exhibit, like the circus was coming to 
town. Apparently, the comparison to a circus was found to be in poor choice and was not included in the 
final statement.
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America” Convoy visit to get your hometown prepared for the real thing.” ' ”” He wrote 
several objectives for advertising including participation and awareness of civil defense, 
but also to persuade Americans that “a strong Civil Defense is necessary to protect our 
Freedoms and build an enduring Peace.” '”' The content of the advertisements and the 
records of the Valley Forge Foundation show the very real ways that the exhibit was 
meant to link civil defense with freedom, religion, and anti-communism. The 
Advertising Council assisted in the effort, but focused primarily on getting people to the 
exhibit and ignored larger statements about the meaning of civil defense. They created a 
packet of ads to be used before and during the exhibit’s visit to a town. The ads marketed 
the exhibit as a “Show you’ll never forget” and advertisements appeared primarily on 
movie pages in local papers.'”^  Nearly all of the marketing alluded to the awesome 
power of the show. A number of articles and ads stressed the importance of the exhibit 
and that at least one member of each household should visit it.'”” The promotion of the 
Alert America exhibit, both by the Valley Forge Foundation and by the Advertising 
Council, focused on the importance of the show in preparing Americans for an atomic 
attack.
Advertisements for the Alert America convoy worked to attract visitors to the 
exhibit. At the request of the FCDA, the Advertising Council created a national 
campaign for the convoy. These advertisements addressed both the atomic energy and 
civil defense components of the exhibit. These ads illustrate the tension between
Kenneth D. Wells, “The What and How o f the ‘Alert America’ Campaign.” LTPSC, BYU 
MSS 1503, Box 3, Folder 1, p. 5.
Kenneth D. Wells, “The Alert America Convoys; Campaign Book.” LTPSC, BYU MSS 1503, 
Box 3, Folder 2, Book 3, p. 70.
One such example is in Los Angeles Times, May 20, 1952, B7.
133 , ‘Big Attendance Urged at Civil Defense Show,” Chicago Tribune, April 23, 1952, A3.
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celebrating the possibilities o f atomic energy and the serious need for civil defense. In 
one, the largest graphic on the page was a mushroom cloud. Next to the cloud, four 
smaller images detailed the features of the exhibit. It said the exhibit would show both 
the “remarkable uses of atomic energy” and a “vivid dramatization o f an actual A-bomb 
attack.” ' ”"' The ad claimed that the Alert America exhibit would show “the ‘inside story’ 
of modem war weapons— and how organized Civil Defense can beat this menace.”' ”” An 
important theme in the Ad Council’s campaign was the use of Paul Revere on horseback 
as the symbol of Alert America. These ads recalled Paul Revere s ride to warn colonists 
of the British invasion. The imagery o f Paul Revere connected Cold War civil defense 
with the American Revolution, aligning the Alert America’s message of survival through 
preparedness with Paul Revere’s early warning and eventual victory by the colonists in 
the Revolutionary War. Promotional materials for Alert America all carried several 
secondary messages; that a visit to the exhibit was a duty of every household, that civil 
defense could protect Americans from atomic attack, and a balancing of the threat of 
possible atomic war with the possibilities of atomic energy. Notably absent from the 
materials produced by the Advertising Council were mentions of the “the Enemy” and an 
emphasis on moral and religious fortitude that infiltrated the promotional material of the 
Valley Forge foundation. This absence points to differences in ideology between the 
Valley Forge Foundation, the Ad Council, and the FCDA.
Advertising Council, Alert America Convoy, 1952, Record Series 13/02/207, File #597, 
Advertising Council Archives, University o f Illinois Archives.
Ibid.
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The Show You’ll Never Forget Is Here In 
(SET NAME OF COMMUNITY)
(SET TIME) (SET PLACE)
S e e  t h e
A h ill IB al-jm k- en e jv y  hI! a b m it?  W h a t  c a n  it d o ?  . . .  w h a t a iv  
ilg u s e s ' ' , , .  w h a t cun  C iv il D e fe n se  d o  to  p m te itt y ou
a n d  y  OUT fan iily  iir Vho e \'psit o f w iem y  attack*#
E v e ry o n e  in u d t in g  ih c c f  q u e s tio n s  to d a y . N o w , th e  A L E R T  
A M E R IC A  sh o w  gsvaa y o u  a  d a m a c k -  â ï i* w ^ . U  f W *  y o u  . , .  
in  a  w ay  y o u 'l l  n e v e r  f o r g #  . . ,  th e  “ in sid e  story" o f m o d e rn  w a r 
w o a p a n s—a n d  bow  o rg a n iz e d  C iv il D efense can  b*ial th i s  m enace. 
Thjit if< iHi!' sh o w  th a t  m a y  s a v e  y o u r  life. D o n ’t  m isa it!
@  YO U ’LL SEE ®  Y O U ’LL SEE... @  YOU I I  S R . .  @  YOU’LL S K „
mvh Ivr « k moiiUg: #«slon wf Bwmy . . . uhU Itctir .. und (mJ . . .  a -n-rràt W * - C i v W  DidMw m
«rniwimk. iv m . aod snrfMr*. Hrhiiuu<Mlir<ii en e.'Wat A H ,«eayU  w«AUig
A P*hiWt showrina he*' l,W eilu th . ivlihl tsifl kuUBmn lu  & |ini|»*rly,Hiiil |lrailutsjrm4tlM«4wb«>
vat tâ UiiïKsrvf/'' limy U  AiugLl! iainiiiiiiriiLy lIimI m iinpf«Nir*d' rM<k>, niW .t«xro
A D M I S S I O N  f r e e !
Figure 9- Alert America poster, Advertising Council
The Valley Forge Foundation created its own promotional materials for the 
convoy. Wells asserted that the convoy offered “real merchandising and promotional 
opportunities” to stores since “practically every department o f a store and every type of
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store has some type of merchandise that fulfills some requirement of Civil Defense.”' ”” 
Department stores set up shop windows that featured preparedness products and also 
included information on the visit of the convoy. Materials sent ahead of the visit by the 
Valley Forge Foundation listed a number of possible promotions for host communities 
such as including civil defense inserts in company mailings, donated space on restaurant 
menus, changing street names for the week, and other imaginative endorsements of the 
Alert America convoy.'”’ These creative marketing efforts helped establish a crucial link 
between preparedness education and the promotion of goods and services that is 
examined in the next chapter. Stores and businesses took part in the promotional 
activities because it allowed them to generate positive feelings in their customers who 
then saw the businesses as providing a valuable public service. This symbiotic 
relationship became even more pronounced throughout the 1950s, as businesses 
published educational material for patrons and employees. The Valley Forge Foundation 
also suggested more traditional promotional activities for the exhibit and sent ahead 
sample speeches, radio spots, and editorials to cities hosting the exhibit.'”* Materials 
created by the Valley Forge Foundation emphasized the role of civil defense in protecting 
the American way of life. The types of promotions as wells the organizers’ statements 
connected the civil defense effort with consumption, religion, and morality.
Kenneth D. Wells, “The Alert America Convoys: Campaign Book.” LTPSC, BYU MSS 1503, 
Box 3, Folder 2, Book 3, p. 76.
Kenneth D. Wells, “The Alert America Convoys: Campaign Book.” LTPSC, BYU MSS 1503, 
Box 3, Folder 2, Book 3, p. 90.
Kenneth D. Wells, “Alert America.” LTPSC, BYU MSS 1503, Box 3, Folder 3.
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Designed to “drive home the reality and nature of the threat that faces us,” the 
Alert America exhibit attempted to motivate visitors to volunteer for civil defense.'””
The convoy was divided into two segments with the first half showing the possible 
enemy attacks on the United States and the second half detailing what individuals could 
do “to meet this threat.” '"'” The layout of the exhibit emphasized that civil defense was a 
responsibility of every American in the Atomic Age. The early parts of the exhibit 
focused on the real threats that faced the United States and used sound, fire, and hissing 
gas to show visitors the face of the enemy as foreboding communist menace. The next 
section contained footage of an atomic blast and a mock attack on an American city. The 
exhibit climaxed with the possible destruction of an atomic bomb. The exhibit ended 
with a focus on hope, with an “inspiring exhibit on the heritage of freedom that is 
America’s and which we guard though Civil Defense.”'"" This last area summarized the 
need for civil defense and exhorted visitors to, “Love your freedoms, live your freedoms, 
guard your freedoms.” The last room contained pictures o f iconic American symbols 
including the Liberty Bell. A child praying was the last visual for exiting visitors.'"'^ In 
no uncertain terms. Alert America connected civil defense with what it maintained made 
a good American: religious and patriotic.
Kenneth D. Wells, “The Alert America Convoys: Campaign Book.” LTPSC, BYU MSS 1503, 
Box 3, Folder 2, Book 3, p. 11.
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What You Will See in the Civil Defense, Alert America Exhibit, Quick Files; Box 6, Civil 
Defense Campaign- General (1), HSTL.
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H a r t  of An in sp i r i ng  exhib i t  on  tiie h e r i t a g e  of f r e e d o m  tha t  ia A m e r i c a ' *  
and which we g u a r d  th roug h Civi l  D efen ae .  Banka of  l ive  f lo w e r*  loaned  
by local  f l o r t e t s  and a b a c k g ro u n d  o: typica l  A m e r i c a n  m u a ic  h e lp  m a k e  
this  ont of the m o a t  moving  p a r t s  of the show, J u s t  beyond i s  a r o o m  
w h e r e  \ i s i t o r s  s ign  up fo r  r e c r u i t i n g ,  f i r s t  a id  t r a i n i n g  and o t h e r  a c t i ­
v i t i es  a l l i e d  with CD, and s e c u r e  t a k c - h o m e  l i t e r a t u r e .
Figure 10- What You Will See in the Civil Defense, A lert America Exhibit
The design o f the Alert America exhibit consciously attempted to convert visitors 
into volunteers by employing graphic illustrations of the destruction o f the atomic bomb 
paired with symbolic images of America’s past. As visitors left the exhibit, they were 
encouraged to sign a personal pledge to volunteer for civil defense in their community, 
but few visitors signed pledge cards. Over one million people visited the convoy in 80
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different cities, but only six percent signed pledge cards.'"'” Despite the small number of 
volunteer commitments, organizers considered the exhibit a success, calling the public 
education results gratifying.'"'"' Based on the number of visitors compared to the number 
of volunteers, the Convoy seemed to fail in its mission to convince Americans o f their 
critical role in civil defense efforts. While it may not have inspired most visitors to 
volunteer. Alert America did effectively connect civil defense with notions of what it 
meant to be a good American.
By creating an interactive exhibit that graphically illustrated the potential 
devastation of an atomic attack while simultaneously promoting peaceful uses of atomic 
energy. Alert America captures many of the tensions inherent in the official civil defense 
rhetoric of the 1950s. The promotion of the show also demonstrated the ways 
Advertising Council commimicated assumptions both about civil defense and, more 
importantly, American families and their homes. Alert America, with its overt emphasis 
on patriotism, illustrates one of the ways civil defense was constructed as an important 
civic duty. It shows how officials attempted to reconcile the destructive power o f the 
atomic bomb with the incredible possibilities of the atom.
Kenneth D. Wells, “Valley Forge Foundation Report on Alert Ameriea Convoys,” February 10, 
1953; LTPSC, BYU MSS 1503, Box 3, Folder 1, p.l7. (The official report listed 1,096,102 visitors in 80 
eities, with 67,171 signing pledge eards; it did not inelude a percentage).
Kenneth D. Wells, “Valley Forge Foundation Report on Alert Ameriea Convoys.” February 
10, 1953; LTPSC, BYU MSS 1503, Box 3, Folder 1, p. 14.
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CHAPTER 5
DUMMY DOOMTOWN IN THE DESERT:
CIVIL DEFENSE TESTS AT THE NEVADA TEST SITE 
Throughout the 1950s, civil defense officials participated in nuclear weapons tests 
at the Nevada Test Site (NTS). During two testing programs, Operation Doorstep in 
1953 and Operation Cue in 1955, the FCDA tested the effect of bombs on mock cities 
filled with the latest consumer goods, including cars, clothing, and frozen foods. The 
public received information about the tests in official reports and films from the FCDA 
and through widespread print and television coverage. The FCDA used the test programs 
to convince Americans of the importance of civil defense and assure them that through 
modest preparation they could survive an atomic attack. This message was imperative to 
the aims o f the FCDA; civil defense could only be successful if  Americans believed that 
an atomic weapon could be survived.
The testing of civil defense measures at the NTS tried to reconcile the use of 
unrealistically small bombs that came nowhere near the destructive power of the USSR’s 
weapons with the certain total destruction that would come from the use of a bomb of that 
magnitude would lead to conclusions that survival was impossible. The FCDA and the 
AEC decided to use smaller atomic bombs rather than testing the full destructive power 
of the hydrogen bomb. This decision limited the applicability of data collected. Private 
industry also took part in the test programs through the donation of goods to be tested in
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the blasts. Examining the various forces that went into the civil defense tests as well 
accounts o f the tests in official reports and the popular press reveals the ways that these 
civil defense exercises continued to frame preparedness as an issue for individual 
American families.
The federal government established the Nevada Test Site in 1950, as increased 
hostilities in Korea heightened Cold War tensions, made the need for a continental testing 
site apparent.'"*” The federal government chose a site in southern Nevada, part of the 
United States Air Force’s Las Vegas Bombing and Gunnery Range.'"*” Officials 
identified several benefits of the site, including a small population of people nearby and 
an abundance of federally owned land and resources within close proximity.'"*’ On 
December 18, 1950, President Truman approved the development of the Nevada Proving 
Ground, later renamed the Nevada Test Site.'"** Nevada residents were notified about the 
site through a press release issued by the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) in January 
1951.'"*” Las Vegas newspapers focused on the positive economic aspects o f the 
construction of the testing site, the added tourist draw, and rejected the possibility of 
health problems as the result of tests only 65 miles away.'”” On January 27, 1951, the 
AEC detonated the first atomic bomb at the Nevada Proving Ground.'”'
Origins o f  the Nevada Test Site (Department of Energy, 2000), 43.
Ibid., 44.
Ibid.
A. Costandina Titus, Bombs in the Backyard: Atomic Testing and American Politics (Reno: 
University o f Nevada Press, 1986), 56.




Collaboration between the FCDA and the Atomic Energy Commission began in 
1951 during the Buster-Jangle test series.'”” The FCDA tested twenty-eight home 
shelters and used the information collected to prepare guides for homeowners about the 
most effective in case of an attack.'”” The 1951 test operation failed to gamer much 
attention nationally, because officials did not promote it widely and did not release 
footage from the actual test. Buster-Jangle set the precedent for future joint operations 
between the FCDA and the AEC.
Two years later, FCDA officials again visited the NTS to participate in an atomic 
bomb test operation, Upshot-Knothole. This time, the FCDA created a series of media 
opportunities to promote the civil defense program. The FCDA referred to their activities 
as Operation Doorstep. In it, FCDA officials recreated two typical American homes and 
tested the effect of an atomic bomb on the houses, shelters, automobiles, clothing, and 
food. ' ”"* The FCDA flooded the media with images of the test operation. This test 
marked the first time civil defense observers were allowed to wimess the detonation of an 
atomic bomb.'”” Millard Caldwell, head of the Federal Civil Defense Administration, 
allowed the observation because he felt “it will stimulate the zeal and raise the 
effectiveness of civil defense volunteers and paid personnel.” '”” The FCDA partnered 
with other federal agencies during the test, including the AEC, the Department of 
Defense, and the Department of Agriculture. Private companies lent support by
Robert L. Corsbie, Operation Plumb-Bob: Shelters and Associated Tests: A Preliminary Report 
o f a Continuing Program (Washington: GPO, 1957), 2.
Ibid.
Federal Civil Defense Administration, 1953 Annual Report, (Washington: GPO, 1954), 59. 




providing the materials to be tested including clothing, food, furniture, and 
automobiles.’^ ’
In Operation Doorstep, civil defense officials examined the effects o f an atomic 
blast on typical American homes. The FCDA constructed a miniature town 
affectionately referred to as “Doom Town,” complete with houses and automobiles. The 
population consisted o f mannequins donated by the L.A. Darling Company and outfitted 
by the local J.C. Penney s t o r e . O f f i c i a l  reports focused on two houses o f “typical 
American construction” inhabited by mannequins in everyday poses such as sitting at a 
table and sitting in the living room.’^^  The Advertising Council sponsored the broadcast 
o f the test on national television to increase attention of three of their campaigns; civil 
defense, blood drives, and the Ground Observer C o r p s . F o l l o w i n g  the blast, accounts 
referred to the destruction of the “Doom Town” and the mannequins as stand-ins for a 
typical American town and average citizens.
Operation Doorstep continued the FCDA’s use of cooperative promotion efforts. 
Various companies lent support to the test program and in return received praise from the 
FCDA and mentions in press accounts and reports following the test. This program of 
cooperative promotion defined much of the FCDA’s efforts during the Cold War. The 
FCDA especially appreciated the support of the automobile industry and praised them in 
their 1953 Annual Report saying, “the most important technical test involving 
participation by private industry dealt with the effect o f atomic explosions on automotive
Federal Civil Defense Administration, 1953 Annual Report, (Washington: GPO, 1954), 59.
http://www.nv.doe.gov/news&pubs/publications/historyreports/news&views/perspective.htm 
Last accessed March 14, 2006; Federal Civil Defense Administration, 1953 Annual Report, (Washington: 
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Federal Civil Defense Administration, 1953 Annual Report, (Washington: GPO, 1954), 60. 
Advertising Council, Annual Report, 1952-53, (New York: Advertising Council, 1953), 6.
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vehicles and their occupants.”’®' Such participation did not go without benefit to the 
donating dealerships. Automobile dealerships in southern California exhibited “atom- 
bombed” cars following the b l a s t . Ma n n e q u i n s  used in the two houses went on display 
in store windows for display and exhibition for the public.’®^ Other companies used the 
tests as an opportunity to secure unofficial endorsements and talk about the ability of 
their product to withstand an atomic attack and then assert that the product could 
certainly withstand everyday wear and tear.’®"* Such relationships were quite important to 
the FCDA. The Administration, due in part to their small budget, relied on others to 
disseminate information about civil defense. Neither did the Administration have the 
funds to secure the items needed to stock “Doom Town.” These relationships further 
helped the FCDA spread the message of preparedness in the marketplace, and helped 
cement the bond between citizenship and consumption.
Press coverage following Operation Doorstep points to conflicting feelings about 
the test program. Some articles certainly reflected the FCDA’s exuberant attitude toward 
the program, but others revealed ongoing debates about the utility of civil defense and 
pointed out lags in the national program. Some authors questioned the prudence o f airing 
the test on national TV, claiming that because many of the mannequins emerged 
relatively unharmed, interest in civil defense would be “paralyzed.” ’®® A number of 
accounts of the test focused on the image of the mushroom cloud and the usefulness of
Federal Civil Defense Administration, 1953 Annual Report, (Washington: GPO, 1954), 59.
Los Angeles Times, May 23, 1953, 11.
“Atomic ‘Victims’ Going on Y iew ” Los Angeles Times, March 30, 1953, 6. “The Wax Models 
Will be Taken on Tour,” Z«5 Vegas Sun, April 3, 1953.
Beautyrest mattress after test in 1955, Hotel Monthly Magazine, Simmons Company Records, 
Collection #731, Archives Center, National Museum of American History.
165 “Television in Review: Yucca Flats Reflects Danger of Overstressing Atom Destruction at Cost 
to Civil Defense,” New York Times, March 18, 1953.
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the test in stimulating interest in civil defense. One example, “A-Bomb’s Grim 
Reminders o f Lagging Civil Defense,” was published in the Philadelphia Inquirer. The 
author claimed that images from the test were in fact the best motivators for civil defense, 
writing, “Better than reams of words these pictures pointed up the personal significance 
of the perils of Atomic Age.”’®® While many articles offered fairly straightforward 
summaries of the test program, an article in Parade Magazine summed up many of the 
conflicting feelings about the test program. In the article, a 21 year-old Las Vegas 
housewife recounted her feelings at the detonation. She wrote, “If you had seen what I 
saw, you’d realize how important civil defense is. All my life. I ’ll remember that atomic 
cloud drifting in the wind after the blast. It looked like a stairway to Hell.”’®’ She 
pointed toward civil defense as an important duty, but failed to acknowledge the 
possibility of survival and instead ended on the note that the mushroom cloud looked like 
a stairway to Hell. Taken together these articles illustrate the complicated range of 
reactions to Operation Doorstep.
In their 1953 Annual Report, the FCDA listed the benefits of the test program. 
They asserted that the real value o f Operation Doorstep did not lay in the collection of 
data on the effect of the bomb on homes and furnishings, but that press coverage of the 
blast “did more to stimulate interest and promote knowledge of self-protection and civil 
defense than any other event during the past year.”’®* This statement explicitly reveals 
the real intent of the FCDA in Operation Doorstep and asserts that the test program was 
little more than a massive publicity stimt. The FCDA released an official film and book
166 “^.Bom b’s Grim Reminder o f Lagging Civil Defense,” Philadelphia Inquirer, March 22,
1953.
“I Saw a Stairway to Hell,” Parade, April 26, 1953, 6-7.
Federal Civil Defense Administration, 1953 Annual Report, (Washington: GPO, 1954), 60.
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commemorating the exercise. The official film, produced by a private company, 
emphasized that “simple, inexpensive shelters in the basement or backyard might mean 
the difference between life and death of this country should it be attacked.” '®^  The film, 
marketed toward civic organizations, schools, and civil defense organizations, retailed for 
$27, including shipping, from the company that produced it.” ®
The official book. Operation Doorstep, was published by the FCDA and made 
available for free to the public. The book summarized the objective of the test program 
as “to show the people of America what might be expected if an atomic burst took place 
over the doorsteps of our major cities.”” ’ The book continued the goal of showing 
Americans’ how a typical town would fare after a blast by including a number of images 
of the mannequins in before and after shots of the houses. The text admonished readers 
to outwit the mannequins and prepare and survive an atomic blast. The FCDA compared 
the mannequins to typical suburban American families throughout Operation Doorstep. 
Despite the optimistic tone of the book that promised readers survival through 
preparation, questions remained about the applicability of evidence from the test. Time 
magazine summarized these doubts in a scathing review of the book and called the actual 
test results “less reassuring” than the book reported.”  ^ The Time review foreshadowed 
the general reaction to later testing programs.
Federal Civil Defense Administration, “Press Information no. 340,” June 28, 1953; Lambie 
Records; Box 3, Civil Defense - General 1953 (2).
Federal Civil Defense Administration, “Press Information no. 340,” June 28, 1953; Lambie 
Records; Box 3, Civil Defense - General 1953 (2). This model, with private enterprise producing and 
distributing films related to civil defense, with the cooperation of the FCDA, continued throughout the 
1950s. FCDA, “For Your Information;” July 22, 1954.
Federal Civil Defense Administration, Operation Doorstep (Washington: GPO, 1953), 2.
“Operation Doorway,” Time, July 6, 1953.
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Figure 11- Image of a mannequin from Operation Doorstep
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Footage from Operation Doorstep found use in later public service films. One 
example of this type aired on television during National Fire Prevention Week. The film, 
The House in the Middle, compared the fates of three-miniature houses that were part of 
the Operation Doorstep testing program. The film asserted that the middle house fared 
the blast the best “because it is free of litter and trash, properly painted, and made o f good 
materials. The other two are completely destroyed by fire as a result o f their rundown, 
badly weathered condition and trash accumulations around one o f them.””  ^ The film, 
while sponsored by the FCDA, paid little attention to civil defense and used the backdrop 
o f the atomic bomb to convince viewers o f the need for fire prevention. According to the 
film, houses with trash and weathered paint were not only eyesores, but “may be doomed 
in the Atomic Age.” The houses with rotten wood, dried grass, and messes inside quickly 
burned, while the only damage the house in the middle sustained was some charring o f its 
exterior paint. The film connected cleanliness with good American ideals and stated that 
cleanliness could guarantee survival. The explicit connections the film made between 
good housekeeping and survival points to the ways that civil defense rhetoric moved far 
beyond actual theories about survival to become a hallmark of what it meant to be a good 
American; that good citizenship was something that could be purchased and displayed 
outwardly, in this case through a clean and nicely painted home.” "*
Administrators at the FCDA viewed Operation Doorstep as a success because it 
dramatically increased the amount o f attention paid to national civil defense efforts. 
However, despite the best hopes of Administrator Caldwell, it did not lead to an increase
Federal Civil Defense Administration, “For Your Information, Public Affairs # 8 1 ,” Sept. 28,
1953.
The House in the Middle, National Paint, Varnish and Lacquer Association, 1954. Film 
footage is part of the Prelinger Archive and is available at www.archive.org.
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in the number of volunteers for civil defense and the FCDA’s budget continued to shrink. 
Based on the success of the test in generating attention for civil defense, the FCDA set 
the plans in motion for an even larger test at the Nevada Test Site in 1955.
The FCDA hoped the 1955 test would serve to reinvigorate lagging interest in 
civil defense. FCDA officials converged on the Nevada Test Site during the Apple 2 test 
and labeled their program Operation Cue. It “was brought into the homes of America by 
every medium of communication,” just like Operation Doorstep was two years earlier.” ® 
Just as before, it served as an opportunity for self-promotion on the part of the companies 
involved in the testing program.
While planners conceived of Operation Cue as a bulked-up version of Operation 
Doorstep, the reaction to the second test was much more negative. During the two years 
between the tests, the national attitude toward atomic weapons grew increasing hostile 
and the press accounts contained much more cynicism than those on Operation Doorstep 
had. The press reported with skepticism about the usefulness of the information gathered 
since the FCDA used a bomb of significantly less power than those currently held by the 
Soviet Union. A series of weather-related delays further soured the media’s feelings 
toward the FCDA as the press and civil defense visitors became frustrated at the 
postponements. Visitors to the test operation faced problems finding hotel rooms in the 
city during the delays.” ® The FCDA did their best to play good host to the visitors and 
planned day trips to Hoover Dam and Death Valley during the delays.” ’ The test
Federal Civil Defense Administration, 1955 Annual Report, (Washington: GPO, 1956), 71.
Press Release, The Sands, April 28,1955; Lambie Records; Box 19, CUE, Operation (the 
atomic test program - Federal Civil Defense Adm.) 1955, DDEL.
Revised Schedule, Operation Cue, Atomic Test Operations Open Shot Program, April 22-27, 
1955; Lambie Records; Box 19, CUE, Operation (the atomic test program - Federal Civil Defense Adm.) 
1955, DDEL.
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eventually took place on May 3, 1955, several weeks after originally scheduled.” *
Nearly all newspaper accounts reported negatively on Operation Doorstep. The Salt Lake 
Tribune’s account of Operation Doorstep encapsulated the tone of most reports on the 
test. The headline read, “Atom Show Fizzles Despite Top Billing” and it went on to 
compare the test to a circus and claimed it “turned into the biggest flop in show business 
history.” The author continued, “Billed as a ‘spectacular’ that would galvanize the 
nation’s prodigious civil defense effort, the atomic tests serious purpose has been lost in a 
bally-hoo hoopla, with press agents stepping on each other’s toes, observers agreed.””  ^
Operation Cue failed to generate the positive press for civil defense that Operation 
Doorstep had just two years earlier. The FCDA failed to take into account changes in the 
public’s feelings toward continental testing and increased apathy toward civil defense.
The larger scale of Operation Cue made observers even more aware that the program was 
little more than a media stunt and the press largely rejected the spectacle.
Three major components made up the Operation Cue program. The observer 
program, the first component, focused on the observation of the detonation by civil 
defense officials.” ® Volunteer civil defense workers participated in the field exercise 
program, the second component in which they practiced responding to an emergency. 
Civil effects tests made up the final component of the Cue program. In these tests, FCDA 
officials gathered information on the effect of the bomb on housing, food, shelters.
™ Federal Civil Defense Administration, Cue fo r Survival, (Washington: GPO, 1955), 1. 
™ “Atom Show Fizzles Despite Top Billing,” Salt Lake Tribune, May 2, 1955.
Federal Civil Defense Administration, Cue fo r  Survival, (Washington: GPO, 1955), 1.
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vehicles, and other products of everyday life. Over two hundred companies participated 
in the civil effects tests by donating products.” ’
For Operation Cue, the FCDA constructed an entire city to serve as the laboratory 
for the civil effects tests. Articles referred to the set-up alternately as “Survival City” and 
“Doom Town,” pointing to two very different fates for the residents of this representative 
American city. An important component of the test program measured the bomb’s effect 
on clothing. Officially known as the “Thermal Ignition and Response of Projects,” it 
consisted of a line of mannequins across the desert floor dressed in donated clothing.’*^  
The imagery of the test is captivating: a line of mannequins dressed in the latest 
moderately priced fashion faced the 30-kiloton bomb. An image of mannequins 
following the detonation shows a not nearly as idyllic scene. Mannequins stood in 
various states of dismemberment with tom clothing. The usage of mannequins in both 
Operation Doorstep and Operation Cue went beyond a desire to make the test houses 
seem realistic. Civil defense officials intentionally dressed the mannequins and placed 
them in typical positions to evoke images o f American families in suburban homes.
FCDA officials hoped such images would spur Americans to act. The mannequins 
functioned as stand-ins for the Americans the FCDA imagined as their core constituency.
Ibid. Articles leading up to the test focused on the testing of donated products. See for 
example, “Effect o f Atomic Radiation on Furniture to be Tested,” Albuquerque Journal, Feb. 11, 1955.
Federal Civil Defense Administration, Operation Cue: The Atomic Test Program o f the 
Federal Civil Defense Program, (Washington: GPO, 1955), 35.
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Figure 12- Operation Cue: The Atomic Test Program o f  the Federal Civil Defense Program, 35.
Figure 13- Line of manikins at 7,000 feet, part of thermal radiation test (after blast). May 5,1955.
Record Group 304; Records of the Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization,
1947 -  1962, National Archives
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The FCDA released a booklet for the public about the test, Operation Cwe.” ® It 
lauded the participation of industry in the test. Just as in 1953, the National Automobile 
Dealers Association provided automobiles for the test program, the L.A. Darling Co. 
provided mannequins, and J.C. Penney outfitted them with clothing.” '’ The FCDA 
reiterated the importance of private industry to the civil defense program. The official 
book also summarized the state of American civil defense in the book and called for a 
reinvigoration of interest in preparedness. The book claimed that the time had come “for 
a renewed effort, for a restudy of local civil defense needs in terms of new information, 
and for a greater effort to show the people of American how they can best prepare for 
such individual and family protection.”” ® The public book on Operation Cue contained 
more detailed information than the Operation Doorstep book did; yet it failed to receive 
much attention from any mainstream media outlets. The lack of interest in Cue was owed 
at least partially to the unreasonably small bomb used in the test. By the time the book 
was printed, the Soviet’s first strike capabilities were exponentially more powerful than 
the test bomb. The information contained in the book was out of date before the bomb 
was even detonated.
The FCDA released the Operation Cue film the same year. Officials attempted to 
defuse the opposition to Operation Cue by adding a caveat to the film that recognized the 
disparity between the 30-kiloton bomb used in Operation Cue and much more powerful
The FCDA and the AEG issued different types o f books and reports for the testing program. 
Operation Cue was meant for public consumption, while Observer Handbooks were given to participants, 
and a second book. Cue fo r  Survival (Washington; GPO, 1955) focused on more technical details o f the 
test.
Federal Civil Defense Administration, Operation Cue: The Atomic Test Program o f the 
Federal Civil Defense Program, (Washington; GPO, 1955), 24.
Federal Civil Defense Administration, Operation Cue: Observer Handbook (Washington; 
GPO, 1955), 3.
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H-bomb the Soviets were known to posses. The film acknowledged that the H-bomb 
would exert 667 times more force as the 30-kiloton atomic bomb and begrudgingly 
conceded that most o f the structures tested would have been completely obliterated had 
an H-bomb been used. With that sticky issue resolved, the film moved on to recount the 
Operation Cue program. A reporter, June Collin, narrated the film as it followed her 
through the Nevada Test Site. She is shown examining the buildings and products to be 
tested. She showed a particular interest in the mannequins, describing them as “Mr. and 
Mrs. America,” and expressed curiosity about the effect of the blast on the various 
textiles and synthetic fabrics used in their clothing. She observed the detonation and 
returned to visit the ruins of the bombed town the following day. Collin ended the film 
by offering viewers her conclusions about Operation Cue, “I took a last look at the debris 
and devastation. This time it was only test, a well-planned test, not a real attack. It was 
test of the things we use in everyday life.” The film played upon the same tropes that 
other civil defense materials used; that preparedness efforts were to be taken up by 
individual families and that survival was possible through self-help. Calling the 
mannequins “Mr. and Mrs. America” implied that they stood in for everyday Americans 
in the blast. The types of homes tested and even the placement of the mannequins 
conveyed a very clear notion of who “Mr. and Mrs. America” was, leaving out 
Americans outside of suburban settings and nuclear families. The Operation Cue film 
reinforced that idea that survival through civil defense was meant for ‘good’ 
Americans.” ®
Operation Cue, Federal Civil Defense Administration, 1955. Film footage is part of the 
Prelinger Archive and is available at www.archive.org.
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Operation Cue failed to gamer the attention that Operation Doorstep had just two 
years earlier. The delays caused part of the press’ animosity, but the irrelevant data was 
the real source of the derision in their reports. Unlike Operation Doorstep that was used 
as a promotional point for companies that donated to the test, donors did not include 
information about their participation in advertisements following the test. The FCDA 
moved away from massive efforts such as the atomic testing program, and instead 
focused their efforts on first aid and the CONELRAD alert system.
Civil defense policies evolved as well, as the FCDA recognized evacuation as the 
best form of civil defense. The evacuation strategy made the information gathered in the 
testing program at the Nevada Test Site obsolete. The FCDA focused its public 
information campaigns on yearly mass evacuation drills called “Operation Alert.”
Civil defense testing continued at the Nevada Test Site with Operation Plumbbob 
in 1957. FCDA official tested shelters and other structures.” ’ FCDA officials did little 
to promote the exercise, it received very little attention in the press, and the FCDA did 
not issue a commemorative book or movie for it as they had with Cue or Doorstep. 
Smaller civil defense activities took place at the Nevada Test Site throughout the 1950s 
and 60s, but were treated with scientific detachment by the press.
Operations Doorstep and Cue offered opportunities for companies and 
organizations to contribute to the civil defense effort by donating products to the 
programs. Retailers also used atomic themes to promote a product or generate business. 
Stores often ran sales linked to atomic testing.” * The atomic bomb became
Corsbie, 3.
A. Costandina Titus, Bombs in the Backyard: Atomic Testing and American Politics (Reno: 
University o f Nevada, Press, 2001), 93.
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sensationalized as a clever way to gain the attention of fickle shoppers. These 
contributions enhanced goodwill for business and industry and offered an opportunity for 
the dissemination of civil defense information outside official channels. This synergistic 
relationship served both groups well during the 1953 exercise, but the increased 
opposition to atomic testing by 1955 limited the potential to earn goodwill by donating 
items to the program.
The FCDA’s testing program at the Nevada Test Site raises important questions 
about whom the intended recipient for civil defense information was in the early Cold 
War. Both series featured mannequin families that mirrored the ideal with a father, 
mother, son, and daughter. The houses they populated resembled those found in 
suburbia, well outside the critical targets identified by the FCDA and the programs 
ignored densely populated urban cores. Films produced after the tests like “The House in 
the Middle,” implied that those whose houses were destroyed brought the destruction 
upon themselves because they were poor housekeepers or lived in slum-like conditions. 
The optimistic and celebratory messages following the detonations helped downplay the 
threats o f atomic war, a calm that lasted through much of the 1950s, when events o f the 
Cold War forced Americans to revisit civil defense.
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CHAPTER 6
PURCHASING SURVIVAL: PREPAREDNESS PRODUCTS 
Entrepreneurial companies throughout the 1950s and 1960s took up the cause of 
civil defense and sold products meant to aid in home preparedness. At the same time as 
these products entered the marketplace, businesses and other groups took up the cause of 
survival as a means o f generating goodwill for their firms. Together these two trends 
were another means through which Americans were sold civil defense in the postwar 
period. These efforts occurred outside the official purview of the FCDA, yet they 
contained many of the same themes that underlay the Advertising Council’s public 
service ads: they touted survivability, the importance o f self-help, and the family as the 
core unit on the Cold War battlefield.
The exact reason companies took up the cause of civil defense in the 1950s 
varied; some companies saw an opportunity to rebrand existing products for the Atomic 
Age, others invented new products to protect consumers from the dangers o f atomic 
bombs, and finally other businesses took advantage of the moment and distributed civil 
defense information as a public service. Interest in civil defense by private companies 
took many forms. Some companies produced straight informational material. Others 
included simple civil defense messages in their regular advertisements to drum up 
volunteers or promote events. Some companies used gimmicks to attract customers and 
displayed items used in the civil defense items in shop windows; these sensationalist
8 2
stunts were usually accompanied by a minimal amount of education. Still other 
companies linked their everyday products with the civil defense cause by showing how 
they could be used in multiple ways to aid in survival. Despite the range in form and 
content, a clear set of messages about preparedness emerged from these materials. These 
ads fell outside the control of the Advertising Council or the FCDA, yet they largely 
reflected the same themes that those campaigns set forth. They subscribed to the same 
narrative: survival was likely and possible with modest financial investment and 
commitment to education about the perils o f the Atomic Age. These advertisements 
offered reassuring messages about the civil defense program. The FCDA encouraged 
private companies to shoulder the burden for public education about preparedness. A 
closer look at the ways in which private companies took up the cause of civil defense 
reveals just how quickly the idea of citizen and consumer merged in the postwar period.
Throughout the 1950s, private companies produced and distributed materials 
meant to educate Americans about civil defense in an effort to provide an important 
public service. These materials took a variety of forms, including straight informational 
materials like pamphlets, comic books and other items aimed at children, and adding 
information about preparedness to existing advertisements. The range in content and 
form represented the various audiences they were intended to reach. Despite differing 
designs, informational materials distributed by businesses largely followed the FCDA’s 
script on survival. They also used imagery similar to that used in the Advertising 
Council’s campaigns by showing survival for middle class American families. Closely 
looking at these types of materials illustrates on ways that the message of preparedness
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was presented to consumers in a variety of forms and helps us locate the points at which 
concepts of citizen and consumer overlapped in this period.
One of the most prominent efforts at public education undertaken by private firms 
in the era was the creation of comic books and cartoons detailing the importance of 
preparedness. These comics stumped for awareness about civil defense and aimed their 
message at children. These efforts largely followed scripts similar to those used in 
FCDA materials for children such as the Bert the Turtle cartoon. While the message was 
altered for the youth audience, the comics followed the same narrative that adult 
materials did, that civil defense was primarily an effort to be undertaken by suburban 
families in their homes. One of the earliest comics, “If An A-Bomb Falls,” emphasized 
the need for civil defense and the dangers of the Cold War. It read in part, “The 
ambitions of Communist dictators make the danger of an atomic attack on our cities a 
grave possibility.”” ® Reiterating the stance of the FCDA, “If An A-Bomb Falls” told 
readers that it was every citizen’s responsibility to be prepared. Another example, “The 
H-Bomb and You,” from 1955 told the story of a group of students and their teacher 
discussing civil defense preparedness. The comic held to the same gendered hierarchy 
that dominated official civil defense material. The teacher listed appropriate jobs for the 
female students such as working in welfare centers, mass feeding lines, and nursing. She 
also told the girls that their mothers’ “job of home defense is especially important.” The 
male students are encouraged to help the civil defense effort by being messengers, 
assisting in rescue work, aiding the block warden, and “keeping mother and dad
189 , ‘If An A-Bomb Falls,” Quick Files; Box 6, Civil Defense Campaign- General (1), HSTL.
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interested in civil defense.” '®® “The H-Bomb and You” reflected an interest in children 
as key to generating interest in civil defense. By telling the male students that they were 
responsible for keeping their parents interested in civil defense, the comic shows how 
material written for children was meant to indoctrinate both the youth and their 
parents.'®' Comic strips in national newspapers also ran civil defense storylines. For 
example, in 1956 A1 Capp “agreed to introduce an appropriate civil defense story line 
into one of his comic strips for a period of 14-16 weeks” and lent one of the characters 
from his “Lil Abner” comic to serve as “Mr. Civil Defense.” The civil defense storylines 
that appeared in comic strips contained the messages as official materials. Comic books 
promoting civil defense were produced as the same time as other comics were beginning 
to explore the dangers of radiation and other science-fiction themes. When one compares 
the great number of science fiction comics published to the relatively few on civil 
defense, it becomes clear that Americans encoimtered a variety of narratives about life in 
the Atomic Age.
Many companies produced cards, booklets, posters, and other materials meant to 
educate their customers about civil defense. These items offered a variety of information 
to recipients, including what to do in case of an atomic attack, the meaning of air-raid 
siren wails, and basic first aid measures. These materials attempted to prepare Americans 
for the seemingly inevitable attack to be launched by the Soviets. The Harrisburg 
Railway Company distributed one of the most striking examples of this type of materials
“The H-Bomb and You,” Virgil L. Couch Papers, 1951-1958 (Couch Papers); Box 21, 
Miscellaneous Articles, Books, and Manuscripts Relating to Civil Defense, 1950-1958 (5), DDEL. The 
comic was produced in full color by Commercial Comic, Inc. and distributed in cooperation with the 
Washington Post.
JoAnne Brown, “A Is for Atom, B Is for Bomb: Civil Defense in American Public Education, 
1948-1963,” Journal o f  American History 75, no. 1 (1988), 70.
85
in the form of a two-sided circular dial titled, “You Can Survive an Atom Bomb.” The 
dial contained “vital information, a combination of basic facts as established by nuclear 
physicists” on what to do in case of an atomic bomb blast. The text on the dial 
admonished recipients to be prepared. On the back of the dial, text encouraged recipients 
to pray that God “strengthen our hearts” and “end forever all wars.” The two-sided dial 
embodies an important contradiction in civil defense education throughout the period.
On the front, an atomic attack is presented as survivable if one only knows what to do. 
The backside, however, reveals a much bleaker reality in which prayer for peace is the 
only real chance for survival. This contradiction gets at the heart of civil defense 
planning throughout the Cold War. Despite the emphasis on survival from a variety of 
sources, widespread recognition existed that total destruction would be the likely result of 
an all-out war with the Soviets.
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Figure 14- Dial from Harrisburg Raiiway Company, “You Can Survive An Atom Bomb
192 .“You Can Survive an Atom Bomb,” Coucb Papers; Box 20, Civil Defense Publications by 
Businesses and Corporations, 1950-1958 (6), DDEL.
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Another important effort companies undertook to educate consumers about civil 
defense took the form of reproducing and distributing educational materials with the 
name of the sponsoring company included prominently somewhere on the copy. These 
materials took little effort by the companies, but gave them a chance to enhance their 
reputation with consumers for doing a public service. One example of this type 
promotion occurred in 1952 when International Latex Corporation reprinted and 
distributed a letter from Philip Wylie on the need for civil defense “as a public service to 
emphasize the need for preparation to cope with atomic warfare.” '®® Throughout its 
existence, the FCDA relied on such cooperation to educate the public about civil defense. 
These campaigns served the both the companies and the FCDA well. By framing their 
efforts as doing a public service, the company improved its reputation. At the same time, 
the FCDA relied on such efforts to spread effectively the civil defense messages in ways 
its paltry budget did not allow it to do directly. These two aims converged in the 
informational materials distributed by private companies. The expectation by the FCDA 
for private companies to take on the important task of indoctrinating Americans on 
preparedness and the fact that private companies willingly took it on helps expose the 
growing relationship between politics and the marketplace that emerged in the years 
following World War II.
Civil Defense Alert, August 1952, 3. Philip Wylie served in the FCDA’s Public Affairs 
Division and witnessed the atomic tests as part o f the official delegation. His 1954 book Tomorrow! 
detailed the destruction o f an atomic bomb attack on two fictional cities. In the city where residents 
practiced good civil defense, most people survived, while the residents o f the second town who ignored 
civil defense instructions perished. It was turned into a radio broadcast narrated by Orson Welles the 
following year. In the early 1960s, Wylie opposed the civil defense policy of borne fallout shelters saying, 
“And certainly nobody in my family is thinking of building a shelter, and if  it would become a (mad) law 
that we bad to, we would have to try to have the law revoked before engaging in such preposterous and 
useless effort.” “Truth About Fallout Shelters,” Redbook, January 1962,43. He revisited civil defense in 
bis 1963 book. Triumph. After a nuclear war, fourteen Americans survive in a shelter. Those who 
survived in the shelter faced grave social ills such as alcoholism, prejudice, and infidelity. M. Nelson 
Hayes, “Wylie’s Survivor’s of the Qovdo,” Los Angeles Times, February 14, 1963, B14.
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Companies engaged in another important educational effort aimed specifically at 
their customers and employees. The materials produced included posters, envelopes for 
the storage of civil defense information, and pamphlets and books. These materials, like 
other privately financed efforts, cleaved to the official FCDA doctrine that preparedness 
was a family affair. An envelope distributed by a telephone company illustrates that 
point. The text on the front of the envelope directed recipients to “file in it civil defense 
information you receive in [the] future, after family discussion and deciding what YOU 
will do to protect your family.” '®'* Companies did not ignore opportunities to combine 
education and profit. Banks across the nation distributed plans and other information on 
the construction of home shelters. Not surprisingly, the banks were more than willing to 
help their customers finance the construction costs.'®® Companies tried to maintain a 
careful balance between education and profit in campaigns such as these. Many 
companies also distributed informational material for their employees and their families. 
These materials ranged from regular newsletters, to pamphlets, and whole books on the 
importance of home preparedness and also carried the message that survival was possible 
for employees and their families.'®® A January 1957 bulletin to the employees o f Pacific 
Gas and Electric is an example of this type o f publication. On the cover, a little girl stood
Envelope— Chesapeake and Potomac Telephone Co. of West Virginia, Couch Papers; Box 31, 
Publications from Businesses and Corporations, 1958-1961 (1), DDEL. Another envelope at the archive 
was a sample and instead o f a company’s name bad the filler o f “Blank Manufacturing Company,” Coucb 
Papers; Box 13, Envelope for Family and Home Survival, DDEL.
“Suggestion for Your Fallout Shelter,” Coucb Papers; Box 36, Publications by Businesses and 
Corporations Relating to Civil Defense, 1961-1963 (1), DDEL.
“Civil Defense Information for your family—prepared for the Employees o f Johnson Wax,” 
Coucb Papers; Box 36, Civil Defense Publications and Materials from Businesses and Corporations, 1958- 
1961, (4), DDEL.
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holding a doll in the shadows of bombed city.'®’ Despite the depressing cover, the text 
inside reiterated FCDA claims that all that was needed for survival was a small amount of 
preparation. The production and distribution of such materials shows how Americans 
received messages about civil defense from a variety of sources. The consistency in 
messages, no matter the source, shows how widespread the faith in survival became in 
the 1950s. A closer reading of these materials, however reveal contradictions in their 
messages, through disconnects between the images and texts, and raises doubt about how 
much the recipients bought the claims that survival was possible.
The civil defense tests at the Nevada Test Site offered companies an opportunity 
to connect themselves to the civil defense program. Companies used their participation 
in the testing program to promote themselves and their products, and, to a lesser extent, 
preparedness. These ads were less concerned with educating the public than the others 
described here and strayed the farthest from official civil defense doctrine. One example 
of this type ran in the Los Angeles Times in 1953. In the ad, a group of southern 
California car dealers promised shoppers the opportunity to see “Atom Bombed Cars.”
In an attempt to avoid the appearance of shameless promotion, the dealers also promised 
information on the “best precautions if you are in your car during an atomic 
explosion.” '®* This advertisement presents one way in which companies used their 
participation in the testing program to their advantage. The car dealers were not 
concerned with disseminating public information, but instead used the people’s interest in 
the atomic bomb to attract shoppers to examine the “atom bombed cars.” J.C. Penney
“Emergency Procedures for P.G. and E. Personnel,” January 1957; Couch Papers; Box 21, 
Miscellaneous Articles, Books, and Manuscripts Relating to Civil Defense, 1950-1958 (1), DDEL.
Los Angeles Times, May 23, 1953, 11. Articles also ran on their appearance. See for example, 
“Atom-Bombed Cars Go On Display Today.” Los Angeles Times, May 22, 1953, 22.
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engaged in promotional programs with the mannequins used in the test program and 
displayed them in shop windows and print advertisements for the store. The displays 
recreated the conditions of the mannequins found following the blast.®®® These efforts 
only marginally incorporated information on survival and instead focused on satisfying 
the curiosity of consumers. J.C. Penney also took advantage of their donation of clothing 
to the test program at the Nevada Test Site and ran ads with the mannequins and lists of 
the clothing that best withstood the atomic bomb tests. Advertisements such as these 
used graphic images from the civil defense testing program and attempted to appeal to 
people’s curiosity. While they were most interested in stimulating interest in a product or 
company, ads of this nature also maintained a certain amount of educational intent by 
including a minimum amount of civil defense information.
One ad in particular was a two-page pictorial o f mannequins before and after tbe blast. Tbe 
copy of tbe ad said, “Tbese mannikins (sic) could bave been live people, in fact, they could bave been you. 
Volunteer now for Civil Defense.” Tbe ad not only described tbe way tbe clothing withstood tbe blast, but 
also gruesomely recounted tbe fate of tbe various mannequins describing in explicit detail tbe ways in 
which tbe mannequins lost or broke limbs and other injuries. Las Vegas Review-Journal, April 3, 1953, 3- 
4.
200 ‘Doom Town Residents.” Los Angeles Examiner, April 1, 1953, 1-3.
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Figure 15- Los Angeles Times, May 23,1953,11.
Some companies sought to take advantage o f the interest in the civil defense by 
linking their products with preparedness. These advertisements pointed to secondary 
uses for everyday products in the preparation for atomic war. One example o f this type 
o f ad ran for a reflective paint called Scotchlite, manufactured by 3M. The ad, entitled, 
“To sell a drink or save a city,” showed two billboards that both used Scotchlite: one for
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Coca-Cola and a highway sign about civil defense.®®' By positioning Scotchlite as able 
to sell Coca-Cola or help a community in case o f an atomic attack, the ads illustrates how 
civil defense entered the marketplace. Other ads offered information about local civil 
defense efforts as well as asserting their products usefulness in home preparedness. One 
ad of this style for Levelor Venetian blinds stated that the blinds could shield residents 
from bomb fragments and debris in case o f an atomic attack. It included a list o f civil 
defense warden districts for the local area and available volunteer positions.®®® The 
Levelor ad balanced public information and promotion of the blinds by positing that the 
blinds could be useful in protecting one’s home in case of atomic attack and by stressing 
the need for volunteers. This ad and others like it connected the cause of civil defense 
with the growing consumer market in the United States following World War II.
Non-consumer products also dominated the civil defense market in the early years 
of the Cold War. Companies that produced goods used in citywide civil defense efforts, 
such as air raid sirens and radio communication systems, also ran advertisements touting 
their products’ contribution to the area’s safety.®®® Other industries, less directly tied to 
civil defense efforts, publicized their utility in preparing for possible attack. Telephone 
companies in particular took advantage of this added promotion. Phone companies, such 
as Illinois Bell and Pacific Telephone ran regular ads that included information about 
expanding phone service and their important role in civil defense. Illinois Bell even 
included information about ‘tele-tags’ for children in their ads, citing the importance of
“Say it in Scotchlite,” Quick Files; Box 6, Civil Defense Campaign- General (2), HSTL.
Levelor ad, Quick Files; Box 1, Civil Defense- Miscellaneous, HSTL.
An example of this ad appeared in the Civil Defender, August 1957,15. In the ad, a panicked 
broadcaster appears with tbe siren in background and tbe text “get ‘em to tbe radio!” Other ads of this 
nature appeared regularly in tbe Los Angeles Times for Motorola sirens.
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identification tags and the added ease o f adding your home number.^^"* Other ads 
included information on what to do in case of an emergency, which, ironically, included 
not using home telephones. One particularly engaging advertisement from Ohio Bell, a 
puzzle for children, entitled “The CD Story” said that the coordination of civil defense 
activities depended on effective communications that were built on good telephone 
facilities.^®^ Much as the advertisements created for the Advertising Council merged 
private interests with the larger public good, telephone companies took advantage of civil 
defense as a means of building support for their industry.
Mass media outlets also took advantage of the interest in civil defense drive sales. 
Magazines especially used civil defense related articles as headlines and promoted these 
issues in other outlets. When Collier’s produced an issue in 1951 dedicated to the “War 
We Do Not Want” including an article about the devastating costs of a fictional A-bomb 
strike on New York, they took out ads in a number of major newspapers.^®^ Throughout 
the 1950s, magazines promoted ‘special issues’ that promised to give readers needed 
advice on what to do in case of attack. These articles and issues often included content 
written by the FCD A and reinforced the message that survival was possible. By the early 
1960s, the support that editors had for the FCDA dissipated and the mood in most
Chicago Tribune, March 16, 1954, 16.
“The Civil Defense Story,” Couch Papers; Box 21, Miscellaneous Articles, Books, and 
Manuscripts Relating to Civil Defense, 1950-1958 (1), DDEL.
The New York Times, Los Angeles Times, and Chicago Tribune each ran the same ad for the 
magazine: Chicago Tribune, October 19, 1951; New York Times, October 19, \9 5 \, Los Angeles Times, 
October 21, 1951. The pattern was repeated for a number o f Collier's issues related to civil defense. Other 
magazines like Redbook, the Saturday Evening Post, and US News and World Report also followed the 
same pattern.
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mainstream magazines shifted away from articles supporting the civil defense program to 
ones berating the government and questioning the prudence of shelter building?®^
While some companies simply provided civil defense information in their ads, 
other companies took advantage of international tensions and sold products meant to aid 
in survival of an atomic attack. The market for these items ebbed and flowed during the 
1950s and 1960s, rising to match increased political tensions, and falling during periods 
of relative calm in international politics. The interest in such products did not suddenly 
appear during the Cold War, but such products had virtually disappeared from the 
marketplace and national conversation following World War 11.^ ®* In 1950, fear 
following the Soviet testing of an atomic bomb blew open the survival market. The 
Soviet Union’s detonation of their own atomic bomb in September o f 1949 and the 
invasion of South Korea by North Korea in 1950 prompted Americans to consider the 
possibility of an attack on their home soil. The federal government responded to such 
concerns by establishing the FCDA and the marketplace saw the emergence of products 
meant to protect Americans from the A-bomb. Retailers o f survival products published 
summaries of their offerings in magazines, newspapers, and trade journals. Through 
these advertisements, private companies sold Americans a concept o f civil defense 
largely based on the official policy of family-based defense.
With the possibility for an all-out war with the Soviet Union looming, 
entrepreneurial companies began marketing home bomb shelters. Largely based on the
By the early 1960s, even the most fervent civil defense proponents questioned the program. 
The Saturday Evening Post ran a number of articles including, “The Case Against Fallout Shelters,” 
(March 31, 1962, 8-9) that opposed the fallout shelter program.
The Readers ’ Guide to Periodical Literature lists no articles between 1945 and September 
1950 on shelters.
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shelters constructed in Western Europe during World War II, these shelters promised 
protection from the blast of an A-bomb. During the early 1950s, a majority of civil 
defense articles focused on such shelters. Companies sold plans for the construction 
of private, family shelters. These shelters promised to “protect you against death and 
danger of flying glass, debris, and collapsing buildings as a result o f atom or hydrogen 
b o m b s . B u i l d i n g  on the FCDA’s model of the family as the core unit in the Cold 
War, shelter advertisements used the family to encourage purchase and compared shelters 
to life insurance. An ad for the Lifesafe Atomic Bomb Shelter used an image of a 
mother, baby, two children, and the family dog running into an underground shelter to 
shill their product. Copy accompanying the image tugged at the heartstrings o f parents 
saying, “O f course you love your children! Even though you may not be concerned with 
your own safety, you’re bound to be concerned with your youngsters'! Don’t let them 
down- but provide them with the comfort and security that they expect from you.” '^* 
While these early shelters lacked the sophistication of the shelters promoted in the early 
1960s during the fallout shelter boom, they did offer moderate protection from the blast 
and heat wave. The bomb shelters of the 1950s fared poorly in the marketplace and the 
market quickly dried up.^’  ^ More important than the technical specifications of the bomb 
shelters is the way that manufacturers positioned their product in the marketplace. 
Companies manipulated the emphasis on family togetherness during the period to
“West Coast Gets Ready,” Life. March 12, 1951, 64. “Wonderful to Play In,” Time, February 
5, 1951. “A Place to Hide,” Time, December 18, 1950.
New York Times, November 1, 1953, S13.
Los Angeles Times, February 1, 1951, 28.
“Would-Be Shelter Mogul Folds Up,” New York Times, September 11, 1951, 24.
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encourage purchase of the shelters. The focus on family shelters as a refuge for suburban 
families carried into marketing strategies for fallout shelters in the early 1960s.
Other companies marketed products that they claimed could provide protection 
from the atomic bomb. Ads made outlandish claims that even the limited knowledge 
available at the time would have discredited. These products played upon some 
Americans’ fundamental fear of an atomic attack. One such product, the Atomicape, 
promised to shield those unlucky enough to be outside a shelter when the bomb struck. 
The product, essentially a plastic sheet, was meant to be used as covering during an 
attack. The ad played on apocalyptic fears saying, “It could happen tomorrow!” 
Curiously, though, the ad promises other applications for the cape “should we be 
fortunate enough to be spared the death, destruction, and disease of an atom bomb, the 
Atomicape has hundreds of other convenient uses.” *^^  Ads for products like the 
Atomicape reinforced many of the policies underlying the civil defense program by 
chiding customers that they must be prepared and promising that survival could be 
guaranteed through preparation. O f course, the manufacturers o f products like the 
Atomicape had a financial interest in convincing customers that survival was possible. 
The market for survival products never took off in the 1950s. Americans spent their 
money purchasing the newly available consumer goods for their homes. Despite the low 
consumption of these products, they point to another way that survival became 
entrenched in the marketplace. Further, advertisements for early shelters firmly 
established the suburban family as the market for shelters, an idea that dominated the 
market through 1963.
213 Los Angeles Times, February 15, 1951, B2.
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Throughout the 1950s and early 1960s, advertisements appeared for services and 
products meant to aid in the continuation of society in case of an attack. For the most 
part, these ads were not meant for consumers, but instead for government and industry 
planners. As the Cold War with the Soviet Union continued, cities and businesses 
recognized the importance of comprehensive disaster planning. New companies sprung
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up to take advantage of the new market and developed underground storage facilities to 
house copies of essential records outside of targeted areas.^’"^ To aid in the moving and 
storage of documents, such sites partnered with companies like Bell and Howell to 
microfilm records prior to their storage. The FCDA applauded such efforts and even 
worked with Burroughs, an electronics and computer company, to produce the film 
“Bomb Proof’ starring Walter Abel. The film chronicled the “survival of a city after an 
H-bomb demolishes its principal industry.” Businesses and government in the town face 
the destruction with cautious optimism because they microfilmed important records and 
the film ends with a promise to rebuild.”  ^ Promotional material about the film 
identified civic groups, sales groups, trade associations, schools and colleges, 4-H clubs, 
women’s clubs, farm organizations, veterans’ organizations, and business and labor 
groups as the intended viewers of the film. The anticipated audience points to an 
important secondary purpose of the film. While Burroughs had a vested interested in 
encouraging various entities to rent underground storage space, the real purpose of the 
film was to convince viewers that they and their communities could survive an atomic 
bomb blast and that society would continue in a relatively normal state following the 
attack. Other ads pointed out the way that everyday industry could be converted to the 
civil defense recovery effort in case of an attack. These ads, while not selling anything 
for the average consumers, had a secondary intent to convince Americans that their 
communities could withstand a Soviet attack and emerge victorious.
Why Industries in the field o f production for defense should go underground,” Couch Papers; 
Box 32, Publications froiii Businesses and Corporations, 1958-1961(6), DDEL; Iron Mountain 
Underground Storage Vaults, Couch Papers; Box 20, Civil Defense Publications by Businesses and 
Corporations, 1950-1958 (3), DDEL.
“Burroughs Presents Bomb Proof starring Walter Abel,” Couch Papers; Box 20, Civil Defense 
Publications by Businesses and Corporations, 1950-1958 (8), DDEL.
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Entrepreneurial companies marketed identification tags for children to school 
districts and worried parents as another important product meant to aid in most attack 
recovery. Advertisements for the tags held that they would aid in the reuniting of 
children with their parents following an attack. Press reports and advertisements 
carefully avoided any other scenarios, never acknowledging that the tags could be used to 
identify dead and disfigured bodies following an attack. These materials championed the 
tags for the sense o f protection they offered children in light of possible atomic war.^*^ 
Promotional materials for the tags featured grinning youths posing with their tags around 
their necks. Tag companies targeted schools, PTAs, church groups, and other civic 
groups to outfit children for the Cold War. National School Studios, the company 
responsible for school portraits for children across the nation, came up with an innovative 
marketing strategy for tags. The company used school photos o f the children and sold 
paper tags for students that featured the child’s photo and address. Schools could 
purchase the tags outright for sixty cents each, but National School Studios would give 
them to the school for ifee if school administrators would allow the studio to send an 
envelope o f pictures, with no obligation, to the children’s parents for purchase. 
Promotional materials for the programs featured a grinning student proudly wearing her 
tag. The creative financing of the tag program highlights one way that companies 
took advantage of the goodwill generated by promoting civil defense and also aimed to 
earn a profit.
Winkler, 115.
Los Angeles Times, May 15,1955, L70. 
Civil Defender, October 1955, 2.
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Figure 17- 1955 Advertisement for Tags, Civil Defender, October 1955, p.2.
Messages about civil defense appeared in advertisements for other products only 
tangentially related to the program as well. Toy companies took advantage o f the 
national interest in civil defense and manufactured toys that recreated the tools of 
survival. Manufacturers attempted to involve children in civil defense through the
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creation of realistic toys for young boys. A Christmas-time Sears Roebuck and Co. ad 
featured a “complete civil defense center in m i n i a t u r e . I n  the 1960s, during the height 
of the fallout shelter boom, W ham-0, the company responsible for the Hula-Hoop and 
Frisbee, manufactured a build it yourself bomb shelter for children.^^^ Such toys 
appeared alongside toys reproducing the tools of uranium mining, civil defense’s less 
threatening cousin. Other toys for children used the image of the atom and mushroom 
cloud to increase appeal. These objects prove useful in understanding the ways children 
were educated about the atomic bomb and how private companies used atomic imagery 
and civil defense to sell products. Toys such as these fed into the idea that civil defense 
was an important practice, but that an atomic bomb attack could be survived
While the FCDA attempted to escape politics and frame itself as a public good, 
civil defense became an important bargaining chip in political campaigns. Campaign ads 
carried images o f destruction and spoke of the potential destruction of an attack on a 
particular jurisdiction. In 1962, a “worried mother” ran ads for Richard Nixon’s 
gubernatorial campaign in California citing a number of reasons why Nixon was the right 
choice for “mothers and grandmothers concerned about the future o f their children” 
including the candidate’s guarantee to strengthen civil defense programs.^^* The 
presence of civil defense in political campaign ads is not surprising, but the similarities 
between the imagery and rhetoric in campaign ads and other non-political ads points to
Los Angeles T/wej, November 18, 1956, 16.
The toy retailed for SI 19 and was reportedly a flop. Douglas Martin, “Richard Knerr, 82, 
Crazed Creator, Dies,” New York Times, January 18, 2008.
Los Angeles Times, November 5, 1962, D4. Lisa McGirr’s Suburban Warriors (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 2001) describes the ways the conservative right took rose to power in southern 
California based on the grassroots movements of people such as this “worried mother.”
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the merging of the government and private enterprise in the years following World War 
II.
The marketing of civil defense during the 1950s reflected the cycles of apathy that 
plagued civil defense officials throughout the decade. When tensions ran high, the 
number of survival products marketed and the number of other goods invoking civil 
defense messages increased. When tensions eased, advertisers focused more on the good 
life promised by the expanding economy. The marketing of civil defense, through 
products meant to aid in survival and in public service type ads, drew on the real 
relationship between politics and the marketplace. Examining the content o f such 
promotional campaigns, reveals how civil defense helped transform consumption into a 
measure of good citizenship.
By the late 1950s, advertisements for civil defense products nearly disappeared 
from the marketplace. This downturn in interest was due to waning interest as 
international tensions come to a relative peace. In addition to the decrease in attention 
to civil defense, a number of groups emerged in the mid-and late-1950s that vocalized 
concern about nuclear weapons and the value of American civil defense. The recognition 
that fallout posed a significant danger following the 1954 Bravo Test in the Pacific led to 
a spate of articles questioning the prudence of current civil defense policy and the 
possibilities for s u r v i v a l . T h e  mid-1950s also saw a rise in the number of protests of
John Gregory Stocke, "Suicide on the Installment Plan": Cold-War Era Civil Defense and 
Consumerism in the United States,” in The Writing on the Cloud: American Culture Confronts the Atomic 
Bomb, Alison M. Scott and Christopher D. Geist, eds., (Lanham: University Press o f America, 1997), 44— 
60.
Perhaps most remembered from the Bravo shot was the plight of the Japanese fishermen on the 
Lucky Dragon. The boat was at sea about 23 miles away from the site o f the detonation and the fishermen 
suffered from a series o f medial problems and the fish were also contaminated. A. Costandina Titus, 
Bombs in the Backyard: Atomic Testing and American Politics (Reno: University o f Nevada, Press, 2001), 
49.
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nuclear weapons testing by groups like SANE. These protest movements helped shift the 
national dialogue from a belief that survival was possible through modest preparation to a 
call for the cessation o f nuclear weapons testing.^^"* The interest in civil defense products 
and information reflected the larger geopolitical trends and increased when tensions 
heightened. In 1958, the moratorium between the United States and the Soviet Union on 
aboveground nuclear weapons testing essentially squelched national discourse on civil 
defense. Cities and the federal government maintained their civil defense infrastructure, 
but refocused their preparedness efforts on natural disasters.
The close o f the 1950s saw a reinvigoration o f debate about civil defense as the 
Berlin Crisis made the possibility o f war with the Soviet Union again seem like a real 
possibility. As civil defense once again entered national discussion, it moved 
underground to family fallout shelters in basements and backyards. Marked by 
dissension and debate, civil defense in the early 1960s reflected the heated moment and 
the eventual official recognition that the ability to survive nuclear war was tenuous at 
best.
^  For a discussion o f Women Strike for Peace and the SANE movement see, Dee Garrison, 
Bracing fo r  Armageddon: Why Civil Defense Never Worked (Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 
2006); Dee Garrison, “Our Skirts Gave Them Courage: The Civil Defense Protest Movement in New York 
City, 1955-1961,” in Not June Cleaver: Women and Gender in Postwar America, 1945-1960, edited by 
Joanne Meyerowitz (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1994).
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CHAPTER 7
GOING UNDERGROUND: FALLOUT SHELTERS AND 
THE END OF CIVIL DEFENSE 
The first years of the 1960s saw a dramatic shift in national civil defense efforts. 
Shelters, which had been virtually ignored since the early 1950s, were resurrected as the 
centerpiece of national civil defense efforts. Improved understanding o f the nature of 
fallout and increased tensions between the United States and the Soviet Union led to a 
reinvigoration of the survival market. Companies no longer touted products meant to 
provide protection from radiation; instead, they developed numerous variations on the 
fallout shelter and products meant to stock them. New national civil defense policy 
emphasized the construction of home fallout shelters meant to house families for fourteen 
days, the length of time needed for the greatest threat of radiation poisoning to pass, 
following a blast. Shelters raised questions about the spirit of community and what post­
attack America would look like. The popular press ran articles about the morality of 
shelters and their benefits.^^^ The rise of the fallout shelter as the best hope for survival 
prompted debate on the cost of survival for Americans.
The fallout shelter ‘boom’ received a great deal o f media attention. 
Advertisements for plans to construct one’s own shelter, to purchase pre-fabricated ones, 
hire a contractor, or move into a new home pre-equipped with a fallout shelter frequently
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appeared in newspapers and magazines. Television, magazines, and newspapers all ran a 
number of reports about fallout shelters, but the messages were divided between ones 
staunchly supporting the move toward fallout shelters, with others calling the program 
absurd and immoral. Narratives appeared in the popular press questioning the prudence 
of shelter building. Other articles focused on the livability and decoration of shelters. 
Advertisements and articles also pointed out the multiple uses for the shelter during 
peacetime; it could be used as storage space, a den, or a rumpus room for children. The 
promotion and debate surrounding fallout shelters in the early 1960s highlights the 
connections between the international tensions of the Cold War and domestic politics and 
culture. The campaigns for fallout shelters also raised important questions about family 
and self-help, just as the earlier campaigns for civil defense did. The debate surrounding 
fall-out shelters, however, exposes the ways that the good-life image of the 1950s became 
fractured by the mid-1960s. The bust of the fallout shelter market by 1963 marked the 
beginning of the end of the “victory culture” that had defined American culture following 
World War
The fallout shelter emerged as the best hope for survival by the end of the 1950s. 
With the recognition that the real threat was fallout, planners realized that long-term 
seclusion in shelters would be the only way to protect Americans from radiation. The 
fallout shelter represented a departure from earlier policies. Early civil defense policy 
recommended shelters, but those were meant to shield occupants from the immediate 
blast and heat wave and not for long-term occupancy. By the mid-1950s, policy shifted
^  The idea of victory culture is explored in Tom Engelhardt’s book, The End o f  Victory Culture: 
Cold War America and the Disillusioning o f a Generation (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 
1998). In it, he argues that the postwar period in the United States centers on the victory o f the United 
States in World War II. The flipside to the victory culture is a sense o f despair that eventually overtakes 
the exuberance of victory.
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to dispersal and evacuation as the primary means of preparedness and survival. As 
weapons grew exponentially in strength, policymakers were forced to recognize the 
futility of evacuation as a strategy. New civil defense plans called for the construction of 
fallout shelters in office buildings, stores, schools, and other public spaces. In addition to 
the public shelters, civil defense officials encouraged Americans to construct home 
fallout shelters. In 1958, a new federal agency was put in charge of civil defense. The 
creation of the Office of Civil Defense and Mobilization (OCDM) merged domestic civil 
defense and military defense in one office. The OCDM offered instructions for the 
construction of home fallout shelters.^^^
The Family Fallout Shelter, first produced in June 1959, detailed the official 
position on s h e l t e r s . I t  began with a statement from acting director of civil defense, 
Leo Hoegh, about the need for shelters In a departure from earlier civil defense 
informational material, he recognized the certain death o f people near ground zero o f the 
blast. He argued, though, that “many more millions- everybody else- could be threatened 
by radioactive fallout.” To combat the threat of fallout, the OCDM called on Americans 
to construct home fallout shelters. According to The Family Fallout Shelter, the threat of 
fallout could not be localized to critical target areas. The book offered detailed plans for 
five different models to shield families from the harmful effects o f radioactivity. It ended
The responsibility for civil defense changed hands several times in the late 1950s-early 1960s. 
In 1958, the Federal Civil Defense Administration and the Office o f Defense Mobilization merged, creating 
the Office o f Civil and Defense Mobilization (OCDM). In 1961, President Kennedy moved responsibility 
for civil defense to the Department o f Defense.
Office of Civil Defense and Management, The Family Fallout Shelter (Washington: GPO,
1959).
Hoegh’s interest in fallout shelters went beyond his role as director o f the OCDM. He also 
served as Vice-president of Wonder Building Corporation who manufactured fallout shelters. Kenneth 
Rose, One Nation Underground, 80; “Charges Ike and Cashes in on Shelters,” Chicago Tribune, April 6, 
1962; “Boom to Bust,” Time, May 18, 1962.
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with instructions about living in a shelter and included a list of necessary supplies. 
Rationing, housekeeping, and clearly delineated roles for each family member were 
needed to guarantee survival in the shelter. The Family Fallout Shelter, much like earlier 
civil defense materials placed the family at the center o f civil defense efforts.
Advertisements for shelters also relied on the family to sell shelters. Newspaper 
advertisements for shelters often appeared on pages for new home developments and 
other household products. Construction companies and pool builders branched out into 
the fallout shelter business. The ads touted adherence to the OCDM’s standards for 
fallout shelters. Perhaps recognizing the limited appeal of a fallout shelter, advertisers 
promoted their multiple uses. One company in Los Angeles, Horn Brothers, sold a 
“combination fallout shelter and family room” that would not “mar the beauty o f your 
home.”^^ ° Another company offered shelters creatively named “Safety Dens, a survival 
shelter with peacetime use as a den, playroom, etc.”^ '^ The Safety Den could be built 
with 100% FHA financing beneath a garage or patio. Most ads for fallout shelters 
included images of nuclear families occupying in the shelters. The accompanying text 
spoke to the need to protect one’s family in light of information released by the OCDM 
on the harmful effects of fallout.
Other entrepreneurial companies constructed homes and apartments with pre­
installed shelters. Builders offered up shelters as one more feature of their new 
development. In southern California, the builders of Sunset Conejo, a large tract of 
houses, ran a number of ads in early 1961 encouraging people to visit the new 
development. The ads talked about the spacious homes, their distance from the smog of
Los Angeles Times, June 5, 1960, K17.
Los Angeles Times, February 19, 1961, SG8.
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downtown, and the peace of mind of having a “family-size. Civil Defense approved 
Fallout Shelter.”^^  ^ Another advertisement for the development offered an even more 
frightening message for potential homebuyers. A white mushroom cloud against a black 
background with the words, “H-Bomb? Survive” encouraged families to look at the 
houses of Sunset Conejo.^^^ Nearly the entire ad is consumed by its insistence on the 
need for home fallout shelters. Fallout protection is touted as the most valuable feature of 
the development. The ad reads, “Family protection is as basic as a build-in at Sunset 
Conejo and the Dales as your range, oven, or disposal, it’s optional o f course, but you 
can’t afford to go without this survival feature, only $1,100.”^^ "^  Apartment builders also 
promoted their buildings with “subterranean civil defense fallout s h e l t e r s . F o r  a brief 
period in the early 1960s, the need for fallout protection merged with the growing 
housing market. For some developers, fallout shelters represented one more way to 
distinguish their model home from the rest.
Los Angeles Times, February 26, 1961,110. 
Los Angeles Times, March 19, 1961, W S ll. 
Los Angeles Times, March 19, 1961, W S ll. 
Los Angeles Times, August 19, 1962, W S ll.
108
SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA’S ONLY 
RESIDENTIAL DEVELOPM ENTS 
WITH FALLOUT PR O T E C T IO N
TAMny BMrtcMK u  *  t  w it*  #  Sum t «nj 
Tlia W ngk O’ *) *'li*»a''...il'j«plfcrB>i c (  c:iir]a
vow i !I*aC t* k. ths «Urri»! kair*.,.*rly
S I,} » ., ,;tOK iiiusnit sri* iiKlVdiil -n v t  k*i uilb Jtur hiniK
*m<0*Mv:«ikW-.'i>; «SU villi'M l wxM k  tat!4fe nd
t u d d  « #  iM k  t lM  n i  r : 'u  r i iT s  iWO(r.tiT..CFvii o ^ i u  
pn*d...M » tiviimkl al tenK  C|||®o,,.1eB<tl t m i  ÙL3 • 
rnb-ttitS Hrtr ti |i#| b l  IKSrO"(l'a-
f* ih q » S < g k 'J ir tR ltt  Sr;i#ec*^»Diit.in« M«..,lP<Jiy lii i ic
I !tJnje?, ,7 „i4,lW^,
ItJW J*. f t .  t}  f,!ïiiràii îii-i-j i» r , «A itliUJi*, /(I?? 4Md 
:.t *'n  c.'iM
«T (rtdk i*«ir i^ iun cr ■«$
üKEÎOni» 
M n i M i
MBi
SUNSET CONEJO and tee  DALES
W O llM llM liU '& m S IU a in B in H .H m M V S  * IR(mP»KHlaOJTARnU&m.aHDA,fl5.«a
Figure 18-£os^#i^efes Times, March 19,1961, WS 11.
For any fallout shelter to provide long-term protection it needed to be stocked 
with food, water, and other necessities. Companies sold survival kits on the assumption 
that little could be done to prepare. The ad copy for one such kit, the Nuclear Attack
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Survival Kit, extolled Americans to wake up because “Your time is running out!”^^  ^
Shelter kits proliferated and nearly all the advertisements focused on the inevitability of 
an attack. Other goods, previously sold for camping, became rebranded as ideal for the 
home fallout shelter. Companies sold home Geiger counters to be included in every 
shelter. One such device, the Nu-Klear Fallout Detector, promised to detect fallout from 
a nuclear bomb. Advertisements for the device guilted householders into buying it 
saying, “It would be better to know at a price this low, no man can afford not to give his 
family this protection.”^^  ^ Home Geiger counters often showed families using the 
devices and focused on their ease of use. The proper use o f the instruments promised 
survival. Stores sold portable radios, ventilation systems, and air filters to make the 
fourteen-day stay in the shelter safe. Advertisements for fallout shelters and products for 
them carried similar imagery to the ads for civil defense products in the 1950s as the 
image of home and family as the front line of defense remained constant, but they were 
nearly devoid of the optimistic tone that pervaded earlier advertisements. Advertisers 
recognized the heavy cost associated with fallout shelters. Shelters were not an easy sale. 
Two weeks in a cramped space, with limited food, no running water, or fresh air was not 
nearly as simple a solution to the threat of war as the Atomicape had been ten years 
earlier.^^* In addition to the difficult stay in the shelter, questions remained about what 
kind o f neighborhood and community Americans would face after emerging from the
“Nuclear Attack Survival Kits,” Couch Papers; Box 36, Publications by Businesses and 
Corporations Relating to Civil Defense, 1961-1963 (3), DDEL.
“Now You Can Be Prepared,” New York Times, October 19,1963,11.
Despite overwhelming scientific evidence about the dangers of fallout, some entrepreneurs 
continued to market products similar to the Atomicape. Fallout suits were plastic full body suits meant to 
“protect against deadly radiation while traveling to a shelter, or to allow the person to leave such protection 
to get needed supplies or to carry out rescue work;” “New Products,” Los Angeles Times, December 11, 
1961, Cl 1. Time Magazine derided the suits saying they provide “no more protection against radiation 
than a raincoat.” “The Sheltered Life,” Time, October 20, 1961.
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shelter. These questions pervaded the advertisements for shelters as manufacturers made 
the case that they were the best hope in the face of a terrible threat. Fallout shelter 
companies were continually charged with taking advantage of helpless citizens during a 
time of crisis.^^® Some companies went as far as to stress that they sold their shelters at a 
fair price. Radiation Shelters, Inc. in California ran advertisements stating that, because 
it was their “patriotic duty to not accept an excess profit in a case directly concerned with 
possible national disaster or survival,” they would only earn 150 dollars in profit on each 
shelter. '^ '^  ^ While the image of the family safe in an underground bunker resembled 
earlier messages about survival, a closer reading reveals deep-seated unease about the 
costs of survival.
The benefit of fallout shelters weighed heavily on the minds of Americans in the 
early 1960s. Mass media articles focused on the financial and moral costs of living a 
sheltered-centered s o c i e t y A  Time article from October of 1961, “The Sheltered 
Life,” summarized the tensions inherent in the shift toward private, home shelters. '^^^ The 
article focused on the “profiteering” of shelter manufacturers. Other articles questioned 
the use of the family in advertisements for shelters. Redbook ran an article that 
questioned the imagery of family used by fallout shelter manufacturers saying, “Life in a 
private fallout shelter would bear little relation to the reassuring picture that the public is
“Some Ground Rules for the Shelter Trade,” Consumer Reports, February 1962, 98. The 
article reports that the Federal Trade Commission issued rules for the advertisement o f fallout shelters. 
Consumer Reports fails to list any o f the requirements and instead listed a series o f  grievances committed 
by manufacturers toward consumers and calls for greater consumer protection laws.
The shelters were advertised for $1995. Los Angeles Times, November 5, 1961, 39.
Arthur Waskow, “Shelter-Centered Society,” Scientific American, May 1962, 34.
“The Sheltered Life,” Time, October 20, 1961. Time ran an advertisement for the issue in the 
New York Times calling civil defense “the second deterrent” and that the issue would tell readers “what 
shelters can and cannot do for his family.” New York Times, October 16, 1961, 60.
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now being offered by some of the companies selling these shelters. The happy image of 
father, mother, and all the children sitting snugly together in their new convertible 
gameroom-shelter, first-aid kit ready but unused, is based on several assumptions that 
may be grossly i n a c c u r a t e . A r t i c l e s  appeared in various magazines opposing the 
shelter p r o g r a m . R e l i g i o u s  periodicals also published articles calling for renewed 
efforts for peace and opposing the fallout shelter program.^'^^ Scientific magazines 
largely opposed the shelter program.^^^ Questions about the fallout shelter program 
entered national dialogue in the 1960s, and civil defense policymakers worked to dispel 
the negative messages in mass media as well as fight public apathy toward the program. 
In 1961, they published a pamphlet. Facts and Fiction About Home Fallout Shelters, that
Truth About Fallout Shelters,” Redbook, January 1962, 73.
“Let’s Stop the Fallout Shelter Folly!” Good Housekeeping, February 1962. Farm Journal 
published an article calling to question the dual-purpose nature of fallout shelters saying calling them the 
“family room o f tomorrow” was a “sugar-coated label” and that Americans ought to reject fallout shelters 
on the basis that they made idea of atomic warfare acceptable. The article ended by asking, “If w e’re 
reduced again to war—this time by bombs that obliterate all life— does it matter if  we survive at all?” 
“Family Room o f Tomorrow,” Farm Journal, March 1960, 132. Other examples include, “Fallout 
Shelters; Dig We Must?,” Newsweek, October 02, 1961,24; “Speaking Out (Case Against Fallout 
Shelters),” Saturday Evening Post, March 31, 1962, 8; “Moral Dilemma of Fallout Shelters,” Semor 
Scholastic, November 29, 1961, 15-19; “Gun Thy Neighbor,” Time, August 18, 1961, 58; and “Shelter 
Skelter,” Time, September 1, 1961, 59.
See for example “Ethics at the Shelter Doorway,” September 30, 1961, 824; and
“Shelter Debate,” America, July 28, 1962, 543. Other liberal religious periodicals like Christian Century 
and Commonweal also ran articles opposing the fallout shelter program. See for example, “Urgently 
Needed an Ethics for Moles,” Christian Century, August 23, 1961, 1006; “Fallout Shelter is Our God,” 
Christian Century, March 7, 1962, 293; and “Lines for a Dedication o f a Fallout Shelter,” Commonweal, 
October 12, 1962, 73.
^  The Bulletin o f  Atomic Scientists published articles opposing the fallout shelter program as 
incapable o f protecting Americans from the dangers of nuclear war. “Thoughts on Bomb Shelters,” The 
Bulletin o f  Atomic Scientists, March 1962, 14; “More Important than Shelters,” The Bulletin o f  Atomic 
Scientists, April 1962, 8; and “Do We Want Fallout Shelters?,” The Bulletin o f  Atomic Scientists, February 
1963,24. The opposition of The Bulletin o f  Atomic Scientists to civil defense planners’ move to fallout 
shelters was a complete reversal o f their position o f the 1950s o f supporting the FCDA and running a 
number o f articles written by FCDA officials. Other scientific publications echoed the claims that 
underground shelters came with a heavy price for humanity. “Effective Bomb Shelters Could Destroy Man 
Kind,” Science News Letter, March 17, 1962, 168. Science News Letter offered the most contradictory 
articles on fallout shelters, less than six months earlier they ran an article, “Fallout Shelters’ ‘Lived-In’ 
Look” singing the praises o f the home fall-out shelter and offering directions at “turning a sheltered into a 
study, a den, a guest room, a stereo Hi-Fi room, or a utility room.” Science News Letter, October 14, 1961, 
2 5 8 .
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laid out a number of fallacies in the popular press about the home shelter, and urged 
Americans to build shelters?"^^ The booklet claimed, “The major harrier to public 
understanding of the need for a massive self-help family fallout shelter campaign 
continues to he the inability of most people to separate the facts and fiction about 
survival, coupled with a sense of utter frustration and futility regarding their ability to do 
anything worthwhile.” *^'* Constant scrutiny of the benefits of the fallout shelter, charges 
of profiteering by manufacturers, and a general apathy toward to civil defense 
preparedness created a limited market for shelters.
Despite the buzz about fallout shelters, few Americans actually constructed them. 
Public opinion surveys conducted in 1963 following the Cuban Missile Crisis pointed to 
a new lull in interest on civil defense. Only twenty-five percent o f respondents said that 
they had thought about building s h e l t e r s . E v e n  with the lack of interest in constructing 
shelters, most respondents were in favor of fallout s h e l t e r s . T h e  disconnect identified 
in this poll, between the lack o f construction of shelters by Americans and a faith in 
shelters, gets hack at the fundamental problem that plagued civil defense officials from 
the beginning. While most Americans could believe that survival might he possible 
through preparation, few were willing to invest their own resources in guaranteeing that 
survival. American consumers had lingering doubts about the possibility of survival.
National Defense Department, Chamber of Commerce o f the United States, “Fiction and Facts 
about Family Fallout Shelters” (Washington: n.p., 1961).
^  Ibid.
Gene N. Levine and John Modell, “American Public Opinion and the Fallout-Shelter Issue,” 
The Public Opinion Quarterly, (29: 2, 1965), 272. In 1960, the percentage of people that had given though 
to constructing a home shelter was only 21%. Hazel Gaudet Erskine, “The Polls: Atomic Weapons and the 
Nuclear Energy,” The Public Opinion Quarterly (27:2, 1963), 160.
Gene N. Levine and John Modell, “American Public Opinion and the Fallout-Shelter Issue,” 
The Public Opinion Quarterly, (29: 2, 1965), 272.
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These doubts caused much of the inaction that civil defense planners identified as apathy 
throughout the 1950s and 60s. Business periodicals published articles about slow fallout 
shelter market. Business Week addressed the market for shelters, saying that despite all 
the talk following the Berlin Crisis fallout shelters became the number one topic of 
conversation, yet a “plodding business. C o n s u m e r  Reports analyzed the survival 
trade saying while it was initially conceived some ten years earlier, it peaked with the 
Berlin Crisis of 1961 but that the response by consumers was “scarcely 
o v e r w h e l m i n g . T h e  article continued that investment in shelter seemed mainly to be a 
habit of the wealthy. T i m e  ran its own obituary of the survival market in 1962, 
blaming the death on “the lull in the cold war.”^^ *' The marketing of the home fallout 
shelters raised questions about the role of advertising for something as serious as 
survival. Repeated calls in the mass media for oversight of the shelter trade and 
regulation of advertisers’ claims demonstrate the different sensibility inherent in the 
fallout shelter market than earlier civil defense products that were promoted and sold 
without question.
For a moment at the end of 1962, it seemed that civil defense might finally come 
to the forefront of American politics. During the Cuban Missile Crisis, grocery stores
“Shelters: Lots o f Talk, a Plodding Business,” Business Week, October 7, 1961, 32. See also 
“Hazards of Selling Survival Products,” Business Week, February 24, 1962, 62, The article talked to 
manufacturers o f equipment for shelters like food rations, dosimeters, and water. It said that distribution of 
such materials through traditional stores was met with failure, and these companies were forced to 
distribute their goods through mail-order outlets.
“Enter the Survival Merchants,” Consumer Reports, January 1962, 47.
Ibid. Several articles focused on their ostentatious shelters. See for example: “Bachelor’s 
$250,000 Bomb Shelter,” Cosmopolitan, January 1954. 86; “Fallout Protection: Here are Case Histories of  
Family Shelters Recently Built in the West,” Sunset, November 1961, 107-114; “The Sheltered Life,” Time, 
October 20, 1961 talked about a shelter in Texas that included “an elevator, a pool table, and a keg of 
wine.”
“From Boom to Bust,” Time, May 18, 1962.
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reported a run on canned goods and worried citizens overwhelmed the phone lines of 
local civil defense offices. The fervor died down quickly and in January of 1963, a report 
by the Associated Press identified a rise in apathy toward civil defense by Americans in 
all fifty states.^^^ Civil defense officials continued to stock community shelters, but 
rejected the self-help theory of civil defense that had been in place since 1950.
Companies no longer mass marketed survival products or shelters. Planning on the 
national level to protect the American public in case of nuclear war practically stopped 
due to budget cuts.^^^
Home fallout shelters carried a heavy cost for homeowners, both monetarily in the 
actual cost o f construction and maintenance, and morally with the questions it raised 
about sharing resources with neighbors and the community in case o f attack. While 
advertisements for fallout shelters and the related accessories continued to use images of 
home and family, their tone lacked the optimism of those for earlier preparedness 
products. Survival seemed less guaranteed by the early 1960s and even if one lived, it 
was at the expense of friends and neighbors who lacked their own shelter. The promotion 
of fallout shelters marked the last gasp of the self-help, family-centered civil defense 
campaign. By the mid-1960s, an emphasis on public shelters replaced home-based 
preparedness.
255  . ‘Civil Defense Apathy Rising, Say Officials,” Chicago Tribune, January 20, 1963, B8.
B. Wayne Blanchard, American Civil Defense 1945-1984: The Evolution o f  Programs and 




In 1965, the Saturday Evening Post questioned what happened to fallout shelters. 
The article, “Anyone for Survival?” compared the fallout shelter trade to a national fad, 
such as hula-hoops, and reported the experience of a shelter dealer in Michigan who 
could not even give away his remaining fallout shelters.^^^ The lukewarm response to 
civil defense consumer goods suggests American ambivalence toward civil defense; 
opinion polls offer evidence of an even more complicated public reaction.
Polls during World War II had indicated a faith in the necessity of civil defense, 
but by the close of the 1950s, Americans began to see futility in such efforts. Thirty 
percent of those polled in 1945 favored a mandatory one-year training period for young 
women in “civilian defense or other work that would be useful in wartime.”^^ * In 1953, 
not even five percent of respondents said that they were doing “any work in the civilian 
defense program” and only two percent planned to construct a shelter in the next year.^^^ 
Americans did not completely reject civil defense, however. In 1956, sixty-five percent 
of those polled approved of a “plan to require every man and woman to spend an average 
o f one hour a week in Civil Defense work.”^^ *' The seeming disconnect between the two
Alfred Balk, “Anyone for Survival?” The Saturday Evening Post, March 27, 1965, 72-74. 
Gallup Poll #359, October 31, 1945, in Gallup Brain, online database, cited March 14, 2006. 
Gallup Poll #517, July 2, 1953, in Gallup Brain, online database, cited March 14, 2006.
^  Gallup Poll # 568, August 1, 1956, in Gallup Brain, onhne database, cited March 14, 2006.
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polls indicates the public zealousness Americans quickly afforded government programs 
in the conservative postwar period, but the personal ambivalence many Americans 
harbored for civil defense. These and other Gallup Polls indicate that a wide gap existed 
between the narrative of civil defense in government publications and the popular media 
and in actual practice. In reality, Americans expressed a more complicated attitude 
toward civil defense than the exuberant attitude claimed by FCDA officials.
Interest in civil defense swelled with the tides of international politics. The first 
wave of interest in the early 1950s coincided with the testing of atomic weapons by the 
Soviet Union. The next fifteen years continued much in the same way. Cycles of apathy, 
enthusiasm, and a return to apathy guided both public interest in civil defense products 
and legislative funding for preparedness. Budget appropriations never increased to levels 
needed to prepare Americans adequately for possible attack. From 1951 to 1961, civil 
defense officials requested $2.5 billion, but Congress only appropriated $622 million for 
the program, only about 25% of the amount officials needed for the a fully functioning 
program.^^'
By the end of the 1950s, Americans’ modest interest in civil defense became 
clear. Also, national magazines began to focus on the futility of preparedness. Women, 
once the key to civil defense, rejected such policies. In 1955, women in New York City 
acted out against the evacuation drills of Operation Alert using the “image of enraged 
motherhood. The women, using their traditional role as mothers protested the
R. Brody and E. Tufte, "Constituent-Congressional Communication on Fall- out Shelters; The 
Congressional Polls," Journal o f  Communication, (14: 1, 1964), 35.
Dee Garrison, “Our Skirts Gave Them Courage: The Civil Defense Protest Movement in New  
York City, 1955-1961,” in Not June Cleaver: Women and Gender in Postwar America, 1945-1960, edited 
by Joanne Meyerowitz (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1994), 202.
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government policy and rallied for an end to “atomic testing, the arms race, and civil 
defense e f f o r t s . E v e n  as President Kennedy called for the construction o f private 
home shelters in 1961, most Americans ignored such calls.^ "^^  Civil defense formed an 
important part of the political discussion in the 1950s and early 60s, but the historical 
record indicates a much more ambivalent relationship by most Americans with the 
program than previously thought.
While civil defense effectively functioned to offer reassuring messages about 
survival, it also offered important instruction about what it took to be a good American 
during the post-World War II period. Official materials of the FCDA and the Ad 
Council, as well as advertisements and information produced by private parties all 
reinforced messages about America during the Cold War. The emphasis on the nuclear 
family and the home as the site of survival privileged suburban families as the norm 
during the period. Further, appeals to men and women as mothers and fathers, placed the 
nuclear family at the center of the civil defense effort and as the most prized unit in the 
militarized American society during the Cold War.
In popular memory, civil defense is recalled as the construction of fallout shelters 
by naïve Americans in their basements and b a c k y a r d s . T h i s  kitschy characterization 
conceals the real tensions of civil defense in the 1950s and 1960s. The informational 
materials, advertisements, and products developed for civil defense lends insight into the
Dee Garrison, Bracing for Armageddon: Why Civil Defense Never Worked (Oxford: New  
York: Oxford University Press, 2006), 209.
Margot A. Henriks en, Dr. Strangelove’s America: Society and Culture in the Atomic Age 
(Berkeley: University o f California Press, 1997), 200.
See for example the website www.CONELRAD.com. The movie Blast From the Past, 
directed by Hugh Scott (1999), focused on a family that lived in their fallout shelter in southern California 
for thirty years and their introduction to late 1990s Los Angeles.
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tensions that drove American society in the years following World War II. They offer a 
real understanding of the ways in which Americans were presented with messages about 
atomic war and survival, home and family, and religion and civic duty. Civil defense 
functioned as more than a just a method of preparing Americans for atomic war, it helped 
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